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ABSTRACT 
CANTY, KAITLIN. Women in the New York State Court System:  A Report on 
Domestic Relations Law.  Departments of Political Science and Women’s and 
Gender Studies, June 2008. 
 
 
The state court system impacts the lives of women throughout New York.  The 
New York State chapter of the National Organization for Women focuses on lobbying 
efforts to encourage or oppose policies based on how they affect women and families.  In 
partnership with the president of the state chapter, the following is a report concerning 
issues influencing women in the state court system in the area of domestic relations law. 
This thesis explores the debate surrounding a recent proposal to institute unilateral 
no-fault divorce in New York, initiatives for mandatory joint custody and mandatory 
mediation in custody disputes, and gender bias in the court system.  For each, background 
information and competing perspectives are presented.  Additionally, specific policy 
recommendations will be addressed with consideration toward bettering women and 
children. 
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The National Organization for Women and Domestic Relations 
Everyone in our society is subject to the laws under which we live.  Laws affect 
many aspects of our lives, including the speed at which we can drive, how much money 
gets taken out of our paychecks, and whom we may marry.  Though some politicians 
purport that we live in a society in which justice is blind to race, sex, gender, ethnicity, 
and religion, members of historically underrepresented groups often have a different 
experience.  Women have had a mixed relationship with the law; essentially, they have 
often been at the subordinate end of the law.  For instance, law prohibited women to vote 
until women’s seventy year struggle culminated in the passage of the nineteenth 
amendment in 1920.  Contraception was against the law for married people until 1964 
and for single people until 1972, and just three decades ago, women could not receive 
credit cards in their own name under the law.  Thus, the law in some ways grants and, in 
other ways, limits options for women, exerting an extraordinary power both to restrict 
and to liberate women.  The branch of government responsible for interpreting these laws 
and applying the law is the judiciary; on the state level, it is the state court.  This thesis 
attempts to explore some of the most prominent issues facing women in the New York 
State court system today in domestic relations law from the standpoint of the New York 
State Chapter of the National Organization for Women (NOW-NYS).  I will begin with a 
brief overview of the National Organization for Women and then provide an outline of 
the following three chapters. 
 The National Organization for Women (NOW) is the largest, most comprehensive 
feminist advocacy group in the United States. Their purpose is “to take action to bring 
women into full participation in society — sharing equal rights, responsibilities and 
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opportunities with men, while living free from discrimination.”1  After the Civil Rights 
Act passed in 1964, which included the last minute addition of sex, feminists rejoiced.  
However, women in the workforce still faced rampant discrimination.  In response, the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was formed in 1965 to enforce the 
Civil Rights Act.  However, in September of 1965, the EEOC ruled 3-2 (those against 
were future NOW founders Aileen Hernandez and Richard Graham) that sex segregation 
in job advertising was permissible.  This issue was not over, however:  “A month later, at 
a conference on Title VII [outlawing sex discrimination] and the EEOC, Dr. Pauli 
Murray—a law professor at Yale and a member of the President’s Commission on the 
Status of Women—denounced the EEOC and its stance permitting Help Wanted Male 
and Help Wanted Female segregated job advertising.”2  Betty Friedan, author of the 
groundbreaking book The Feminine Mystique contacted Dr. Murray about the issue and 
the feminist movement was soon reignited. 
 On June 28-30, 1966, the Third National Conference of Commissions on the 
Status of Women took place in Washington, D.C.  “The theme was ‘Targets for Action,’ 
and many of the delegates wanted to pass a resolution demanding that the EEOC carry 
out its legal mandate to end sex discrimination in employment. They [the delegates] were 
told that they had no authority, not even to pass a resolution, but they were determined to 
take action,”3 NOW’s founding page reports.  There were stirrings to form a new 
organization for women, similar to the civil rights organizations blacks had created:  
“Friedan wrote the acronym N O W on a paper napkin. Some 15-20 women assembled in 
                                                 
1 National Organization for Women. “About NOW.” Retrieved 19 May 2008 
<http://www.now.org/about.html>. 
2 National Organization for Women. “The Founding of NOW.”  Retrieved 19 May 2008 
<http://www.now.org/history/the_founding.html>. 
3 Ibid. 
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Friedan's hotel room that night. Among them were: Catherine Conroy, Inka O'Hanrahan, 
Rosalind Loring, Mary Eastwood, Dorothy Haener, Pauli Murray, and Kay Clarenbach.”4  
In a hurried fashion toward the end of the conference, Gene Boyer recalls that “Catherine 
Conroy pulled out a five-dollar bill from her wallet and, in her usual terse style, invited us 
to ‘put your money down and sign your name.’ NOW was a reality and I think we all felt 
somehow we had participated in a significant beginning.”5  Founded by 28 women, 
NOW’s purpose was:  “To take action to bring women into full participation in the 
mainstream of American society now, assuming all the privileges and responsibilities 
thereof in truly equal partnership with men.”6  Today, NOW has more than 500,000 
contributing members and hundreds of chapters across the U.S., including a New York 
state chapter based in Albany.  It is an activist organization, meaning that it “seeks to 
effect change through lobbying, advocacy, education and protest, and does not serve 
clients.”7
 NOW-NYS is the largest women’s political action organization in New York, 
representing over 14,000 women and men in 24 chapters. The organization is “dedicated 
to fighting for women’s equality and to improving the status of women in New York.”8  
NOW-NYS is governed by an Executive Committee and a State Council.  Officers 
include:  President: Marcia Pappas, Albany, NY; Executive Vice President: Lori Gardner, 
Gronton, NY; Legislative Vice President: Barbara Kirkpatrick, Syracuse, NY; Secretary: 
Gaby Moreno, New York City; and Chair: Alberta S. Roesser, Rochester, NY. 
                                                 
4 Ibid. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Ibid. 
7 National Organization for Women – New York State. “About NOW-New York State.”  Retrieved 19 May 
2008 <http://www.nownys.org/about.html>. 
8 Ibid. 
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 Priority issue areas include the Equal Rights Amendment, reproductive freedom 
and health care, ending racial discrimination, lesbian rights, ending violence against 
women, ending the business of human trafficking, pay equity, and domestic relations.  Of 
these priority areas, this thesis is focused on the area of domestic relations law.  NOW 
asserts that “[a]s a result of current divorce practices and laws, women and children are 
falling into poverty. Every effort must be made to assure fairness in all domestic relations 
law.”9
 The three issue areas I focus on with respect to state domestic relations law are:  
the proposal to enact unilateral no-fault divorce, proposals to make both joint custody and 
mediation mandatory in custody disputes, and gender bias in the state court system.  
Chapter one examines the movement by proponents of no-fault divorce, including bar 
associations and lawyers associations, and opponents’ responses.  I conclude that the time 
is ripe for divorce reform, but no-fault divorce is not one that should be enacted.  Chapter 
two discusses mandatory policy initiatives currently in front of the Assembly.  There is 
action toward making joint custody mandatory, mainly led by fathers’ rights groups.  
Opposition comes from women’s groups, such as NOW, concerned about women and 
children’s well-being.  I also examine mandatory mediation and conclude that its effects 
on the power imbalance between the spouses and on domestic violence victims make it 
bad policy.  Finally, I provide an examination of gender bias in the court system, with 
special attention to the state court system and a comprehensive survey conducted by the 
New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts.  There is pervasive gender 
bias and specific policy recommendations are suggested. 
                                                 
9 National Organization for Women-New York State. “NOW-New York State’s Issues.”  Retrieved 19 May 
2008 <http://www.nownys.org/issues.html>. 
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 Overall, the following chapters seek to provide an examination into some of the 
most important issues in domestic relations law facing New York women today:  
unilateral no-fault divorce, mandatory joint custody and mandatory mediation, and 
gender bias.  NOW-NYS has taken a firm stand on all of these issues and will continue to 
advocate for policies that favor women and children.
 5
The Movement for No-Fault Divorce in New York State 
 Marriage is undoubtedly one of the most important social and civil institutions in 
American society.  Indeed, children are socialized early on that marriage is the 
appropriate expression of a healthy adult relationship.  Despite marriage’s status as a 
staple of society, its definition has been changed multiple times and the rights of 
individuals who choose to marry and then divorce have been altered throughout history.  
In today’s society, the reality is that many marriages end in divorce – about 40 to 45 
percent of marriages will dissolve.10  Laws regarding divorce differ based upon the state 
residence of the spouses, and often dictate the grounds upon which a couple may divorce.  
This chapter will focus specifically on the debate surrounding fault grounds versus no-
fault divorce.   
All states, except New York State, offer divorce on unilateral no-fault grounds.  
Unilateral no-fault divorce is the dissolution of a marriage granted on the basis of a 
showing by either spouse that a marriage is “irretrievably broken.”  Essentially, both 
spouses do not have to agree to end the marriage in a unilateral divorce.  In a no-fault 
divorce, one spouse claims that s/he is in a broken marriage for a specified period of time, 
such as six months or one year, depending on the state, and s/he can obtain a divorce 
without the consent of his/her spouse.  In contrast, a fault divorce requires proof of fault 
on one spouse’s part in order to obtain the divorce.  Fault grounds vary by state, but often 
include adultery, conviction of a felony, cruel and inhuman treatment, and willful 
desertion.  The prime purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the proposal to enact 
unilateral no-fault divorce in New York.  I will first examine a brief history of changes to 
                                                 
10 Crary, David. 2007. “U.S. Divorce Rate Lowest Since 1970.” Associated Press.  Retrieved 3 April 2008 
<http://www.breitbart.com/article.php?id=D8P1MG601&show_article=1>. 
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marriage and then specifically to no-fault divorce, then move to discuss the current 
divorce law in New York, other states’ divorce reforms, and proponents’ and opponents’ 
arguments regarding the measure.  Finally, I will offer what I deem to be the best route 
for New York to take in divorce reform. 
Historical Changes to Marriage 
Evan Wolfson argues that there have been four extensive changes to marriage 
throughout history:  divorce, women as legally subordinate to their husbands, marriage 
and choices about sex and parenting, and race discrimination in marriage.11  I will briefly 
touch upon the first two reforms, as my purpose here is to highlight divorce and the 
historical inequality of the spouses. 
 When one married legally in the sixteenth century, it meant for life, despite 
adultery or any irreconcilable differences.  Divorce first emerged in most states following 
the American Revolution.  The connection between the colonists breaking free from their 
mother country and citizens gaining the freedom to divorce can essentially be expressed 
by the sentiment:  “How could consent in marriage (as in government) be considered 
fully voluntary, if it could not be withdrawn by an injured partner?”12  Legislators 
outlined a few clear grounds for divorce, including adultery, sexual incapacity, and an 
extended period of desertion.13  According to historian Nancy Cott, during this time, “If a 
spouse was divorceable, it was because he or she had committed a public wrong against 
the marriage as much as a private one against the partner; the public wrong justified the 
                                                 
11 Wolfson, Evan. 2004. Why Marriage Matters:  America, Equality, and Gay People’s Right to Marry. 
New York:  Simon & Schuster Paperbacks. 
12 Cott, Nancy F. 2000. Public Vows:  A History of Marriage and the Nation. Cambridge:  Harvard 
University Press, p. 47. 
13 Ibid., p. 48. 
     7
state’s interposing its authority.”14  In divorces, men had to prove their manhood by 
showing that they provided for their dependents and women were often called upon to 
demonstrate that they had been properly obedient.   
Later, more grounds for divorce were added in several states.  These reforms 
included extreme cruelty, fraudulent marriage contract, gross neglect of duty, and 
habitual drunkenness.15  As divorce became more salient, religious leaders spoke out 
against the perceived reprehensible disrespect for the institution of marriage.  Though 
divorce gave men and women more freedom in their intimate and private decisions of a 
life mate, some religions, most notably Catholicism, taught that marriage would be 
harmed by such a change.  It is true that once the legal system became more accepting of 
divorce, more divorces occurred, but marriage did not dissipate.  Rather, divorce allowed 
citizens to correct mistakes, rather than subject themselves to a lifetime of misery. 
 A second change to marriage was the lifting of coverture and marital unity laws 
that placed women in inferior positions to their spouses. A husband and wife were one 
person in the eyes of the law under coverture and the theory of unity.  This raised 
important questions about what, if any, individual rights each spouse held.  Historically, 
women were on the subordinate end of the rights of married persons since wives’ 
identities were essentially absorbed into that of their husbands.  Wives were unable to 
apply for credit until a few decades ago, husbands were allowed to abuse them, and the 
concept of marital rape was unheard of.  Indeed, in Rebecca Ryan’s piece, “The Sex 
Right:  A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption,” she quotes Rollin M. Perkins’s 
treatise on criminal law from 1957:  “A man does not commit rape by having sexual 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 49. 
15 Ibid., p. 50. 
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intercourse with his lawful wife, even if he does so by force and against her will.”16  
Essentially, a wife was a husband’s property and he could use her as he saw fit, even 
violently or sexually.  
The women’s liberation movement of the 1960s and 1970s raised public 
consciousness about rape and violence against women.  Violence against wives was 
brought to the forefront during this time, but it was not until 1984 that a New York 
appellate court overturned the state’s marital rape exemption and other states followed.  
Many believed that this and other allowances of women as separate from their husbands 
would undermine marriage.  As recently as 1998, the Southern Baptist Convention called 
for a woman “to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband.”17 
Though some oppose changes to gender roles, most would agree that women are entitled 
to retain rights after marriage. 
  I highlight this history to identify that marriage reform has been an ongoing 
process for centuries and the latest reform facing New York State – no-fault divorce – is 
just one proposal in a long line of changes to matrimonial law.  The historically 
disadvantaged position of women in marriage is also relevant to their ability to secure a 
fair settlement following the dissolution of marriage.  The position of women during and 
after a divorce will be central to the discussion of unilateral no-fault divorce proposals. 
No-Fault Divorce 
 As early as 1948, “the American Bar Association’s section on divorce 
recommended moving to a no-fault principle, pointing out that 85 to 90 percent of 
                                                 
16 Ryan, Rebecca M. 1995. “The Sex Right:  A Legal History of the Marital Rape Exemption.” Law & 
Social Inquiry 20(4): 941-1001, p. 941. 
17 As cited in Wolfson, Evan, p. 65. 
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divorces were uncontested and therefore denoted marital breakdown on both sides.”18  
The fundamental justification for no-fault divorce is that “most Americans could obtain a 
divorce by claiming ‘irreconcilable differences’ or ‘an irretrievable breakdown’ – in other 
words, by simply asserting that their marriages no longer worked”19   
In 1963, the California legislature passed a House Resolution to initiate a study of 
the laws of divorce, from which four major themes were observed: 
1. the high divorce rate 
2. the adversary process creating hostility, acrimony, and trauma 
3. a need to recognize the inevitability of divorce for some couples and 
attempt to make the legal process less destructive for them and their 
children 
4. charges made by divorced men that the divorce law and its 
practitioners worked with divorced women to acquire an unfair 
advantage over former husbands20 
 
No legislation was recommended from these hearings, but they served as a catalyst for a 
twenty-two member Commission on the Family established by Governor Edmund G. 
Brown in 1966.21  The Commission recommended the creation of a family court, the 
elimination of fault as grounds for divorce, and a revision to the community property 
distribution rules.22  These were not immediately enacted, but they served as the basis for 
the bills introduced in the California assembly and senate during 1969.  James A. Hayes, 
a member of the Assembly Judiciary Committee, was appointed chairman of the 
Assembly Judiciary Committee in 1969, and he introduced Assembly Bill 530, the 
Domestic Relations Act of 1969, which specified that the only grounds for divorce were 
                                                 
18 Cott, Nancy, p. 196. 
19 Wolfinger, Nicholas H. 2005. Understanding the Divorce Cycle:  The Children of Divorce in Their Own 
Marriages. New York: Cambridge University Press, p. 79. 
20 Parkman, Allen M. 2000. Good Intentions Gone Awry. Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
Inc., p. 73. 
21 Ibid., p. 73. 
22 Ibid., p. 74. 
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irreconcilable differences and incurable insanity.23  Though this particular bill did not 
pass, a very similar bill was enacted as the Family Law Act of 1969.  The California law 
set precedent for a strict no-fault divorce based upon six innovations: 
1. No grounds are needed to obtain a divorce.  This permissive standard 
facilitates divorce and represents a dramatic departure from the 
restrictive norms of the traditional law. 
2. Neither spouse has to prove fault or guilt to obtain a divorce.  This too 
is a radical change signaling a rejection of the moral framework of the 
old law. 
3. One spouse can decide unilaterally to get a divorce without the consent 
or agreement of the other spouse. 
4. Financial awards are no longer linked to fault.  The new standards are 
based on the parties’ current financial needs and resources rather than 
their past behavior, whether guilt or innocence. 
5. New standards for alimony and property awards seek to treat men and 
women ‘equally,’ thereby repudiating the sex-based assumptions of 
the traditional law. 
6. New procedures aim at undermining the adversarial process and 
creating a social psychological climate that fosters amicable divorce.24 
 
Other divorce reformers who were trying to institute no-fault divorce in other states were 
encouraged by California’s example.  On August 6, 1970, the Uniform Marriage and 
Divorce Act, a comprehensive marriage and divorce act, was passed by a national body 
of lawyers known as the Uniform Law Commission.  The act encourages that states adopt 
“irretrievable breakdown,” essentially no-fault, as a basis for divorce.  As Kargman 
writes, it “is not law but a model for state legislatures to accept or deny in part.”25   By 
1985, most other states followed this model and enacted some form of no-fault divorce. 
 
 
                                                 
23 Ibid., p. 74. 
24 Weitzman, Lenore J. 1985. The Divorce Revolution:  The Unexpected Social and Economic 
Consequences for Women and Children in America. New York: The Free Press, p. 15-16. 
25 Kargman, Marie W. 1973. “The Revolution in Divorce Law.” National Council on Family Relations 
22(2): 245-248, p. 246. 
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New York State Divorce Law 
New York is currently considered a fault state meaning that if both parties do not 
agree to a divorce, one party must show grounds.  New York has a no-fault ground based 
on a husband’s and wife’s negotiation of a written agreement of issues in a divorce in 
partnership with living apart.  There is no unilateral (undertaken by one spouse and 
opposed by the other) no-fault divorce ground.  The four fault grounds for divorce in 
New York are:  cruel and inhuman treatment, abandonment for at least a year, adultery, 
or imprisonment for at least three years.26  Two additional grounds for divorce exist:  
“Living separate and apart pursuant to a decree of separation for a period of one or more 
years [and] [l]iving separate and apart pursuant to a written agreement of separation, for a 
period of one or more years after the execution of such agreement.”27  In other words, if 
both parties want a divorce, they can negotiate an agreement including issues such as 
custody, child support, maintenance, and property division, and upon living apart for one 
year, the contract becomes grounds for divorce. 
On September 12, 2007, no-fault legislation Assembly bill A9398-A was 
introduced by Assemblyman Adam Bradley.  The bill would amend Section 1, Section 
170 of the domestic relations law by adding a new subdivision 7: 
(7) The relationship between husband and wife has broken down 
irretrievably for a period of at least six months, provided that one party has 
so stated under oath.  Except under exigent circumstances placed on the 
record by the court, no judgment of divorce shall be granted under this 
subdivision unless and until the economic issues of equitable distribution 
of marital property, the payment or waiver of spousal support, the 
payment of child support, the payment of counsel and experts’ fees and 
expense as well as the custody and visitation with the infant children of 
                                                 
26 Grossman, Joanna. 20 October 2004. “Will New York Finally Adopt True No-Fault Divorce?” FindLaw. 
Retrieved 3 April 2008 <http://writ.lp.findlaw.com/grossman/20041020.html>.  
27 WomansDivorce. “Divorce in New York.” Retrieved 3 April 2008 
<http://www.womansdivorce.com/new-york.html>.  
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the marriage have been resolved by the parties or determined by the court 
and incorporated into the judgment of divorce.28
 
Essentially, the bill would amend current divorce law to allow for a no-fault provision in 
New York.  The existing six provisions listed above would still be legally viable; this bill 
would add a no-fault option.  One spouse would have to testify that he/she cannot get 
along with his/her spouse and that it has been this way for at least six months.  Divorce 
would then be granted after a resolution of property distribution, maintenance (spousal 
support), child support, counsel fees, and custody has been established, “except under 
exigent circumstances.”  The latter phraseology has not been explained by the drafters of 
the bill and thus it appears likely that many conditions may be applied under this 
provision.  The bill has been read once and it was referred to the Committee on Judiciary 
on January 9, 2008. 
A Look at Other States’ Divorce Reforms 
 All states besides New York have an unilateral no-fault divorce provision.  
However, not all states have retained their original strict no-fault divorce laws.  Here, I 
will examine two states:  Louisiana and California (the state that started the wave of 
divorce reform). 
 Louisiana divorce law, except in the case of covenant marriage, currently has a 
no-fault ground with a separation period of 180 days if no minor children exist or if 
physical or sexual abuse against the spouse or a child of the spouse has been shown.  
There is also a separation of 365 days when there are minor children of the marriage.29  
Robin Fretwell Wilson, a law professor, reports that “a group of more than 100 legal and 
                                                 
28 Draft of bill obtained from “Forum:  The Need for No-Fault Divorce” on October 11, 2007 at the 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York.  Online access can be found at 
<http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A09398>. 
29 Louisiana Civil Code § 103.1. 
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family scholars…released a report [in the fall of 2006] urging legislators to consider 
passing extended waiting periods for no-fault divorce.”30  The fault grounds available in 
the state include adultery and when the other spouse has committed a felony and has been 
sentenced to death or imprisonment at hard labor.31  In 1997, Louisiana’s Legislature 
became “the first in the nation to approve a law allowing a new and more binding form of 
marriage contract, one that would permit divorce only in narrow circumstances such as 
adultery, abuse, abandonment, a lengthy marital separation or imprisonment on a 
felony.”32  This covenant marriage option was mainly the result of the movement led by 
conservative Christians and pro-family activists to rewrite or repeal no-fault divorce laws, 
and to date, Arkansas and Arizona have also added covenant marriage.  No-fault divorce 
is still an option in Louisiana, but recent legislation of covenant marriage and longer 
waiting periods has made it more difficult for couples to get no-fault divorce. 
 California has two grounds upon which divorce may be granted:  irreconcilable 
differences, which have caused the irremediable breakdown of the marriage, and 
incurable insanity.33  There have been various proposals to modify no-fault divorce in the 
state due to concerns over the high divorce rate, its effects on children, and the high rate 
of poverty in single-parent homes.  One analysis that served as a catalyst for legislative 
change was sociologist Dr. Lenore J. Weitzman’s study showing that women’s standards 
of living decrease by an average of 73 percent in the year after divorce while men’s 
increase by an average of 42 percent.34  However, a reanalysis of the data in 1996 by 
                                                 
30 Ibid. 
31 Louisiana Civil Code § 103. 
32 Sack, Kevin. 24 June 1997. “Louisiana Approves Measure to Tighten Marriage Bonds.” New York Times. 
Retrieved 12 April 2008 <http://query.nytimes.com/gst/ 
fullpage.html?res=9800E2DF1631F937A15755C0A961958260>. 
33 California Family Code §2310. 
34 Weitzman, Lenore, p. 339. 
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Richard R. Peterson revealed that this statistic was flawed.  He concluded estimates of a 
27 percent decline in women’s standard of living and a 10 percent increase in men’s 
standard of living after divorce.35  Weitzman replied by asserting that, “My sample 
intentionally oversampled people in longer marriages and those with higher incomes 
where differences between husbands’ and wives’ post-divorce standards of living are the 
greatest. It may be that the weighting system used to reconstitute a representative sample 
was either not applied or was applied incorrectly.”36  However, she maintains that it was 
just one statistic in a 500-page study and defends her prime conclusion that women and 
children are unfairly and disproportionately burdened economically by divorce stands.37   
One proposal to amend the current no-fault divorce law in California is AB 913, 
which would create the Family and Children Preservation Act.  This bill would require  
parties filing for dissolution, legal separation or nullity, and who have 
minor children to file a ‘joint parenting plan,’ or if the parents cannot 
agree on a parenting plan, to file a pre-mediation parenting questionnaire.  
The bill allows dissolution based on irreconcilable differences only upon 
the mutual consent of the parties and only upon completion of an 
education or counseling program, either separately or together.  If the 
parties do not consent to the dissolution, party must prove fault by a 
preponderance of the evidence in order for the court to grant the 
dissolution.”38
 
This act would severely limit spouses’ ability to achieve no-fault divorce.  Essentially, 
spouses with minor children who would like to divorce must come to an agreement about 
custody and maintenance issues prior to dissolution of the marriage.  If they cannot agree, 
they would need to submit to mediation.  Spouses must also attend an educational or 
                                                 
35 Peterson, Richard R. 1996. “A Re-evaluation of the Economic Consequences of Divorce.”  American 
Sociological Review 61(3): 528-536, p. 532. 
36 Weitzman, Lenore. 1996. “The Economic Consequences of Divorce are Still Unequal:  Comment on 
Peterson.”  American Sociological Review 61(3):  537-538, p. 538. 
37 Ibid., p. 538. 
38 Hershkowitz, Donna S. and Drew R. Liebert. 1997. “The Direction of Divorce Reform in California:  
From Fault to No-Fault…And Back Again?” Retrieved 3 April 2008 
<http://www.library.ca.gov/crb/98/04/currentstate.pdf>, p. 139. 
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counseling program.  If both parties do not agree to a divorce, fault must be proven.  It is 
not clear if additional grounds would be added under this proposal since the current 
grounds are irreconcilable differences and incurable insanity.  A second proposal in 
California within the last fifteen years has been proposed statutory initiative 97RF0053, 
which 
adds traditional fault-based grounds for dissolution and eliminates 
‘irreconcilable differences’ as a ground for divorce when there is a minor 
child of the marriage or either of the parties has sole or joint physical 
custody of a child from a different relationship.  The proposed initiative 
provides defenses to claims of fault which, if found to be true, prohibit the 
court from granting a dissolution.39
 
This bill would allow fault-grounds, likely adultery, abandonment, and cruel and unusual 
punishment, to California’s divorce law.  It would also void irreconcilable differences as 
a legal ground for divorce when there are minor children involved.  As is evident, both 
proposals focus on marriages with minor children and there have been concerns about the 
effect of divorce on children, which will be addressed in the arguments section.  Neither 
initiative passed, but there is some momentum to attempt to enact these provisions again. 
 Other states have proposed their own initiatives in the last fifteen years to reform 
divorce law.  There was a bill proposed in Georgia, for example, that would limit no-fault 
grounds only to consenting parties with no minor children or if one party has been 
convicted of domestic abuse or a protective order has been issued.40  In addition, in 
Massachusetts, a bill was introduced to prohibit unilateral no-fault divorce for 
irretrievable breakdown of marriage.41  There has been a general trend to reform divorce 
                                                 
39 Ibid., p. 140. 
40 Ibid., p. 140. 
41 Ibid., p. 140. 
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law and it is likely that this pattern will persist as interest groups and real people 
experiencing divorce continue to share their experiences.42
The Debate over No-Fault Divorce in New York 
 With every other state in the nation adopting some form of no-fault divorce, the 
New York legislature has felt pressured to adopt the policy.  The question that should 
concern legislators is whether or not reform would be good for New York women, men, 
and children.  First, I will examine those groups that favor no-fault divorce and what 
arguments they provide.  I will then present the opposing side and the reasons offered for 
blocking unilateral no-fault divorce in New York. 
 The push for no-fault divorce has been led by legal professionals.  Organizations 
that favor the measure include the New York State Judicial Institute, Association of the 
Bar of the City of New York, Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York 
(Family Law Section), New York State Bar Association, American Academy of 
Matrimonial Lawyers (New York Chapter), New York County Lawyers’ Association, 
Pace University School of Law, and Hofstra University School of Law.  All of these 
organizations sponsored a forum entitled “The Need for No-Fault Divorce” in October 
2007.  Other organizations that have endorsed no-fault divorce, but did not sponsor the 
forum, include the Capital District Women’s Bar Association, The Legal Project, the Erie 
County Bar Association, the Onondaga County Bar Association, the Brooklyn Bar 
Association, and the League of Women Voters of New York State.  Their arguments 
include that no-fault divorce will reduce the bitterness between parties, which hurts 
children, create a better option for victims of domestic violence, and reduce costs. 
                                                 
42 For more examples of state proposals, please see Ibid. 
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 Proponents of no-fault divorce argue that it will eliminate the unnecessary finding 
of fault within a marriage.  When partners need to find fault in their spouses, it 
encourages hostility and bitterness.43 Attorneys also argue that the fact that one person 
must be at fault is demeaning to the courts, the attorneys, and the parties, especially if the 
partners do not agree that there is one partner to blame.44  Some claim that “[i]n fact, an 
argument can be made that by permitting parties to end their marriages in a non-
confrontational manner society is actually supporting marriages and healthy relationships, 
in that people can end marital relationships without destroying all the feelings that still 
might exist between the parties.”45  This is especially important should there be children 
involved, as it sets up a more congenial environment, rather than one of blame.  The 
hostility does not bode well for establishing a productive foundation for raising 
children.46  In their book Children and Marital Conflict:  The Impact of Family Dispute 
and Resolution, Cummings and Davies assert that “[a]pproximately 40% to 50% of 
children exposed to severe marital hostility (i.e. marital violence) exhibit extreme 
behavior problems…a proportion between 533% and 667% times the behavior problem 
rates in the general population.”47  Without the heightened hostility of determining fault, 
opponents of fault divorce argue that children will be exposed to less conflict. 
                                                 
43 Rothbart, Lawrence N. November 2004.  “Report by the Committee on Matrimonial Law:  The Case for 
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October 11, 2007. 
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 Those who favor no-fault also highlight its effect on domestic violence victims.  
They argue that states that passed unilateral no-fault divorce saw a reduction in female 
suicides, domestic violence rates, and the number of women murdered by their partners, 
pointing to a 2003 study “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  Divorce Laws and 
Family Distress” by Betsey Stevenson and Justin Wolfers.  By comparing the adoption of 
unilateral divorce to the rate of female suicide and intimate partner murder in the 
subsequent years, this study concludes that total female suicide declined by around 20% 
in the long run in states that adopted unilateral divorce statutes and domestic violence 
reports of husbands against wives were reduced by more than one-third.48  Proponents of 
no-fault argue that there is a link between allowing spouses to exit a marriage without 
finding fault and the reduction of female suicides and the number of women murdered by 
their partners.  Stevenson and Wolfers assert that they interpret their results as an 
indication that “the reduction in female suicides reflects both women escaping from bad 
marriages and the redistribution of power within marriages that results from increased 
access to divorce”49 from no-fault divorce.  Another concern for domestic violence 
victims is that they “may not be able to afford the cost and expense of a grounds trial” 
and a fault divorce would “force her to incur thousands of dollars in legal expenses.”50  
Those who favor unilateral no-fault divorce argue that it would allow victims to exit 
                                                                                                                                                 
Era of Family Upheaval. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.; Amato, Paul R., Laura Spencer 
Loomis, and Alan Booth. 1995. “Parental Divorce, Marital Conflict and Offspring Well-Being During 
Early Adulthood.” Social Forces 73: 895-916. 
48 Stevenson, Betsey and Justin Wolfers. 2003. “Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  Divorce Laws and 
Family Distress.” NBER Working Paper #10175. Obtained from Forum:  The Need for No-Fault Divorce 
on October 11, 2007.  The study cited may be accessed through the National Bureau of Economic Research 
website at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10175>. 
49 Ibid., p. 11. 
50 Women’s Bar Association of the State of New York. 2007. “An Open Letter in Support of No-Fault 
Divorce.” Obtained from Forum:  The Need for No-Fault Divorce on October 11, 2007. 
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marriage to an abusive spouse without having to engage in a costly and emotionally 
draining legal battle. 
 Another assertion proponents of no-fault make is that under fault grounds, “a 
spouse who lacks economic resources may be forced to remain in a marriage that is not 
working for them…. [while] a spouse who has economic resources has the option of 
moving to a neighboring state to obtain a divorce under that state’s ‘no-fault’ statute.”51  
This, in turn, favors the wealthier spouse and provides more power to achieve divorce 
against the will of the other spouse. 
 Furthermore, the costs involved are unnecessary, say opponents of a fault-based 
system.  The significant amount of time litigating fault costs taxpayers and litigants 
money that does not need to be spent.52  Eliminating fault grounds, proponents say, 
would eliminate the need for costly litigation for both litigants and taxpayers.53
 Opponents of no-fault divorce have largely been comprised of two strange 
bedfellows:  conservative pro-family activists and women’s groups, specifically the 
National Organization for Women.  The pro-family activists’ primary concern is keeping 
families intact, and they argue that no-fault makes it easier to divorce.  Some call 
marriage under the current no-fault laws “notarized dating” rather than a firm 
commitment that marriage should be.54  They identify the increase in divorce rates in 
states with no-fault.  However, most studies indicate that following a ten-year period, 
                                                 
51 Rothbart, Lawrence N., p. 3. 
52 Ibid., p. 3. 
53 Kriseberg, Lois A. 2007. “No-Fault Divorce.” Opinion piece submitted to the National Organization for 
Women – New York State. 
54 Schoenfeld, Elizabeth. 1996. “Lighting the Match.” The Hoover Institution. Retrieved 3 April 2008 
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divorce levels return to previous levels.55  In response to this, some states, such as 
Louisiana, have instituted covenant marriage, which is harder to both enter into and 
dissolve, and groups have been lobbying for the repeal of no-fault laws. 
 Women’s rights groups approach no-fault divorce from a very different angle.  
Their objective is to ensure that women and children receive the best possible outcome 
from a divorce.  It is important to note that feminists were not at the forefront of the 
campaign for no-fault divorce; on the contrary, they were largely silent on this issue as it 
was spearheaded by those in the legal profession.  Leading the fight against no-fault 
divorce in the state of New York is the state chapter of the National Organization for 
Women.  They argue that there is a tragic effect on women and that no-fault divorce will 
not remedy women’s current disadvantage in the courts.  Their arguments include that 
unilateral no-fault divorce decreases the bargaining power of a woman who opposes 
divorce, fault-based divorce is still necessary when women’s current financial state is 
taken into consideration, no-fault will disadvantage homemakers, and no-fault is not good 
for domestic violence victims.   
NOW claims that approximately 95% of divorce cases in New York are resolved 
by negotiation between couples, which is the best possible process since it allows a 
bargaining process to occur thus leveling the ground between the spouses.56  NOW 
asserts that no-fault takes away any bargaining leverage the non-moneyed spouse has 
since under current law this person can negotiate a fair agreement before agreeing to the 
                                                 
55 For the most recent study of this, please see Wolfers, Justin. 2003. “Did Unilateral Divorce Laws Raise 
Divorce Rates?  A Reconciliation and New Results.”  National Bureau of Economic Research. Available 
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56 National Organization for Women. “No-Fault Divorce.” January 2007.  Retrieved 3 April 2008 
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     21
divorce.57  If unilateral no-fault divorce were enacted, this would not be the case – the 
spouse with no grounds could “obtain a divorce over the objections of the less powerful 
spouse without negotiating a divorce settlement.”58  For instance, NOW asserts that in the 
process of a divorce, a husband could transfer assets to a girlfriend, sister, or parent, 
essentially any third party, even while still married, thus giving the appearance of fewer 
financial resources.  Right now under fault divorce, a woman can try to prevent her 
husband from dishonest behavior by wielding a valuable bargaining chip:  her consent.59  
In addition, NOW highlights the ambiguity of the term “exigent circumstances” in the 
current bill.  They wonder what standards will be applied to determine the definition of 
this legal language and the potential loopholes that will hurt women. 
NOW also rejects the argument that women are doing better financially and do 
not need the protection of fault grounds.  Some claim that the non-moneyed spouse is not 
always the woman since women have gained more job opportunities and are working 
outside the home.  However, NOW asserts that there is still the gender pay gap, which is 
currently at 77 cents for white women, and they highlight the 2006 New York Times 
article entitled “Gender Pay Gap, Once Narrowing, Is Stuck in Place.”60  They emphasize 
that “[l]ast year, college-educated women between 36 and 45 years old, for example, 
earned 74.7 cents in hourly pay for every dollar that men in the same group did, 
according to Labor Department data analyzed by the Economic Policy Institute. A decade 
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59 Gordon, Robert M. 1998. “The Limits of Limits on Divorce.” The Yale Law Journal 107(5): 1435-1465. 
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earlier, the women earned 75.7 cents.”61 Clearly, women cannot be assumed to be on an 
equal financial footing in marriage based solely on alleged claims of pay equity. 
NOW also asserts that it is important to look at the effect on states that have 
already instituted unilateral no-fault divorce.  NOW points to a July 1996 report entitled 
“Achieving Equal Justice for Women and Men in the California Courts” that finds that 
“the period for which support was awarded was getting shorter since the advent of no-
fault divorce” and shortly after the passage of no-fault divorce, judges acknowledged that 
the law could negatively affect “displaced homemakers” after a marriage.62  In one 
divorce case of a disabled woman who had been a housewife and mother for most of her 
25 year marriage, the judge of the appellate court wrote: “If a woman is able to do so, she 
certainly should support herself.  If, however, she has spent her productive years as a 
housewife and mother and has missed the opportunity to compete in the job market and 
improve her job skills, quite often she becomes, when divorced, simply a ‘displaced 
homemaker.’”63  Some women commit to maintaining the household during the marriage 
and thus do not acquire job skills and experience, and upon divorce, they are in danger of 
financial ruin.  No-fault divorce removes the bargaining leverage for homemakers to 
secure a better settlement since the moneyed spouse may leave the marriage without 
justification; her consent would no longer be required.  Furthermore, homemakers often 
lack independent funds to secure proper legal counseling in order to negotiate a 
settlement and this would be exacerbated by the allowance of no-fault since the husband 
does not have to take blame in the courts for the dissolution of marriage, should that be 
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the case.  As the law stands now in New York, divorce cannot be granted unless fault 
grounds are proven or a settlement agreement is negotiated and spouses have separated 
for a year.  For the moneyed spouse to exit the marriage, s/he needs to either show fault 
on the part of the non-moneyed spouse or negotiate.  If this is not the case, the non-
moneyed spouse loses her/his bargaining power of consent. 
Maggie Gallagher, a nationally syndicated columnist and an affiliate scholar at the 
Institute for American Values in New York City, also argues that no-fault divorce doesn’t 
differentiate between a marriage of four months and forty years, which leaves women 
who may have been counting on this continued standard of living with few options.64  
Unilateral no-fault divorce is problematic in that it will hinder the ability to negotiate 
reasonable settlements since the non-moneyed spouse gives up her bargaining leverage.  
Women who have been married for years may not be able to negotiate fair maintenance 
and property distribution settlements under no-fault divorce because their consent to 
divorce is not required.   
Gallagher also asserts that “no-fault divorce facilitates domestic violence by 
failing to recognize and punish men financially for their marital crimes.”65  A NPR news 
piece from 2006 on no-fault divorce in New York asserts that fault grounds provide 
victims of domestic violence with the much-needed bargaining chip to negotiate health 
insurance and financial assets with the husband who likely controls all the finances that 
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they will need after the marriage.66  For instance, as cited by the Domestic Violence Task 
Force of the Bar Association of the City of New York 
Justice Silbermann in Havel v. Islam, 273, A.D., 2d 164 (1st Dept. 2002), 
found that the husband’s assault on his wife with a barbell was a critical 
factor in determining the allocation of marital resources. This hard won 
victory should not be undermined by enacting no-fault legislation that 
does not specifically address the role of fault in dividing marital 
property.67
 
In short, women’s rights advocates find enacting no-fault divorce to be 
problematic for many reasons, including its effect of decreasing the non-moneyed 
spouse’s bargaining power and the poor financial position in which it leaves some 
women, particularly homemakers.  They see several other divorce reforms, such as 
counsel fees and better enforcement of domestic violence laws in divorce, that should be 
enacted instead of and before unilateral no-fault divorce. 
Policy Recommendations for New York 
 New York is the only state without unilateral no-fault grounds.  Though this fact 
raises questions about whether or not New York is in the wrong, it also beckons the 
inquiry as to why New York seems to be holding out on this reform.  This chapter has 
thus far looked at the changing institution of matrimony, a brief history of no-fault 
divorce, the current law in New York, other states’ recent initiatives for divorce reform, 
proponents’ arguments, and opponents’ arguments.  I now provide specific policy 
recommendations for New York’s divorce law. 
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New York should delay adopting no-fault divorce until other reforms are enacted.  
Although it seems as though the first instinct is to allow the freedom of someone to end 
the divorce whenever s/he desires, this leaves out considerations of what happens after 
the divorce is granted.  The issue of how both spouses fair should be addressed in 
instituting divorce reform.  By enacting no-fault divorce at this time, it appears that it 
would likely disadvantage women and children.  Under the current system in which the 
vast majority of people negotiate their own settlements, spouses can include provisions 
that the court cannot initially order, such as child support until 21 years of age, but the 
court will still enforce such an agreement.  This bodes well for children and the financial 
future of women.  While both proponents of and opponents of no-fault divorce claim to 
look out for the economically disadvantaged spouse, the argument that fault provides a 
bargaining chip seems more plausible than the assertion that the non-moneyed spouse 
would be forced to remain in a marriage in which they may not want to be while the 
moneyed spouse moves to a neighboring state for a divorce.  In reality, the argument that 
the moneyed spouse could travel to another state to get a divorce contradicts the fact that 
many states have residency requirements for those seeking a divorce.  It is likely that this 
would come into play if a spouse attempts to get a divorce in a neighboring state against 
the will of the other spouse. 
No-fault divorce, however, is not inherently bad.  Marriage should not be a legally 
suffocating institution from which there is no reprieve.  Rather, the choice to leave should 
be accompanied by an agreement fair to both parties.  This agreement process is currently 
experienced by 95% of New York couples.  The effects of no fault in hurting the 
economically disadvantaged spouse, often the woman, and leaving her in a job market in 
     26
which it is even more difficult to find work, particularly if she has been a housewife, is 
most alarming.  It appears that these concerns, however, may be remedied through 
divorce reform, but not through the institution of no-fault divorce in the state. 
Nancy Erikson, J.D., LL.M., M.A. (forensic psychology) has practiced and taught 
family law for over thirty years and performed custody evaluations with her M.A. degree.  
Her analysis of no-fault divorce and its timing is among the most relevant I have seen.  
She argues that the push for no-fault was led by the New York State Bar Association and 
it has overshadowed the real concerns of economically disadvantaged spouses going 
through divorces.  She contends that no-fault will not only not relieve these concerns, for 
instance the lack of a counsel fee bill and an expert fee bill, but it may also exacerbate 
them.  Her recommendation is that other reforms be “proposed, discussed, and enacted.  
Then a time period should be allowed to elapse in order to determine whether the reforms 
are working and are achieving their goals.  Thereafter, assuming the playing field has 
been substantially leveled, the Legislature can once again take up the issue of no-fault 
divorce.”68  This recommendation is what I am advocating. 
She recommends several reforms prior to no-fault legislation.  The following 
reforms are lacking in New York and appear to provide more substantive and positive 
change for the most vulnerable in divorce.  These provisions should be enacted first and 
then the possibility of unilateral no-fault divorce should be revisited once these have 
provided a fairer situation for both spouses.   
The first is attorneys’ fees/appointment of counsel for indigent spouses.69  
Erickson asserts that if no-fault is enacted without the passing of this provision, then the 
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wife, if she is the non-moneyed spouse, may lose bargaining power.  This is because she 
will not have access to a competent attorney and whatever the husband wants to offer, 
“she must accept unless she is prepared to litigate, and without sufficient funds to hire an 
attorney, she is unable to do so.”70  The non-moneyed spouse lacks resources to hire an 
attorney and currently there is not a requirement to award counsel to this spouse and the 
court is also not mandated to explain why attorneys’ fees are being denied.71  Joel R. 
Brandes, a practicing family law attorney in New York, concurs that counsel fees are in a 
court’s discretion.  He writes, “The Court of Appeals in DeCabrera v. DeCabrera-Rosete 
noted that DRL §237 replaced §1169 of the Civil Practice Act and significantly omitted 
the word ‘necessary,’ which had preceded the phrase ‘to enable the wife to carry on or 
defend the action.’ This omission gave the courts some flexibility when considering an 
application for counsel fees. Indigence is not a prerequisite to an award of counsel 
fees.”72 Likewise, the New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts 
found that there is a “need for prompt awards of interim attorneys fees, made regularly 
during the course of litigation and made with adequate consideration of the amount the 
spouse with the greater financial resources is paying for an attorney.”73  Due to the 
current discretion of the court and its failure to act on providing attorney fees, the non-
moneyed spouse is left with few options in her attempt to secure counsel.  
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Erickson also lists better solutions for the problem of dependent spouses who 
need health insurance after divorce.74  Spouses often receive health insurance through 
one partner and may accept jobs without adequate health insurance knowing that their 
husbands or wives have good benefits.  When marriages dissolve, the benefits disappear 
as well, and under current no-fault proposals, health insurance is not provided for 
dependent spouses.  A study done by Marc L. Berk, PhD and Amy K. Taylor, PhD found 
that “marital status is a major predictor of the health insurance coverage of women 
between 35 and 64 years of age. Divorced women are twice as likely to be uninsured as 
married women and they are also much more likely to depend on Medicaid assistance.”75  
These findings are even more alarming when one considers that divorce increases 
women’s risk for physical and mental health problems in addition to increased alcohol 
consumption.76  Massachusetts is one state that has better medical coverage from the 
spouse who has the coverage to the noncovered spouse after divorce, and New York 
should follow this lead.77  
Furthermore, Erickson argues that improvements in spousal support and 
maintenance laws need to be enacted prior to no-fault.  Unilateral no-fault would allow 
even more detrimental maintenance since the bargaining leverage of consent from the 
non-moneyed spouse would be taken away.  The moneyed spouse would have little 
incentive to compromise under no-fault divorce since irreconcilable differences would be 
sufficient grounds.  This leaves the non-moneyed spouse without the bargaining chip of 
negotiating the exit of the marriage since currently consent is required by both parties, 
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and under no-fault, divorce would be granted unilaterally.  The need for this reform and 
the arguments regard women’s decreased economic standing following a divorce has 
been substantiated by several studies.  For instance, a longitudinal study by Karen C. 
Holden and Pamela J. Smock reveals that the economic consequences for women after a 
divorce are consistently worse than for men.  This is due to “the division of labor during 
marriage, lower wages paid to women both during and after marriage, and the lack of 
adequate postdissolution transfers to women.”78
The fourth reform is enforcement of the law to require that courts consider 
domestic violence in all custody/visitation cases.  Erickson claims that this law is largely 
ignored, and this has a detrimental effect on victims of domestic violence.79  Her 
statements are substantiated by the New York Judicial Committee on Women in the 
Courts, which found that “[v]ictims’ access to the courts is limited by their being 
dissuaded by law enforcement officials and court personnel from proceedings in criminal 
and family courts and by having their claims trivialized or ignored.”80  Similarly, another 
reform that should be enacted is the extension of the statute of limitations for divorce on 
grounds of cruelty and on lawsuits by battered spouses against their abusers for damages 
for intentional torts.  The current statue of limitations is 5 years from the last act of 
cruelty and Erickson makes the wise recommendation for it to be “5 years from the time 
the victim separates from the abuser, because while she is with him, she may not be able 
to take any steps toward divorce.”81  This extra time is especially important since the 
court’s treatment of domestic violence often dissuades women from bringing their cases, 
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as the New York Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts found:  “A significant 
number of women who bring petitions for court-ordered protection fail to follow through, 
leading to dismissals for failure to prosecute.  Women who fail to proceed are deterred in 
part by the hostile or indifferent treatment they receive in court.”82
In addition, Erickson argues for reforming the system of appointing mental health 
“experts” to perform custody evaluations.  She states that there are no requirements for 
these experts with regard to their knowledge in several areas, including domestic 
violence, child development, New York law on custody, visitation, child support, and 
evidence.83  As far back as 1987, the New York Times wrote that “[s]uch differences 
[between experts’ evaluations] are possible because there is no hard-and-fast procedure in 
making custody evaluations; each professional is free, within broad standards, to 
highlight some data while playing down others. And, even with the same observations, 
experts can arrive at differing interpretations.”84 This discretion paired with the lack of 
expertise is of real concern in the effort to ensure the fairest and most beneficial outcome 
to families. 
The final three reforms Erickson would like to see passed before no-fault are 
appointment of more judges in counties having huge backlogs on their dockets, a fully 
staffed Matrimonial Oversight office “to receive complaints and concerns of litigants and 
attorneys, to gather necessary statistics, and to make recommendations for changes in 
statutes and court rules,” and finally, sanctions for spouses who fail to disclose significant 
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income and/or assets or who commit perjury.”85  These would allow more cases to be 
heard, more oversight to better serve clients, and more justice in penalizing spouses who 
lie and conceal important information. 
These reforms would provide real change for the most vulnerable when seeking 
divorce.  It is problematic that there is so much clamoring for divorce reform, yet these 
very real issues are not being adequately addressed.  The counsel fee bill, the 
maintenance laws, and the sanctions for spouses who lie about their assets are the most 
pressing.  I cannot make an informed judgment with regard to the effects of divorce 
reform on domestic violence victims since domestic violence attorneys are split over no-
fault divorce reform.  I can state that the well-being of marital abuse victims must be 
thoroughly assessed prior to any reforms and as stated in the chapter on gender bias, 
judges do not often recognize domestic violence.  At the forum on no-fault divorce in 
New York City on October 2007, a question was asked about some of the above reforms, 
in particular the counsel fee bill.  The response by the Honorable Sondra Miller was that 
we can get this no-fault bill in now and then work on passing the others after.  However, 
historically it seems as though change comes slow, and when there is momentum for 
change, activists should take advantage of it and pass the most comprehensive reforms 
they can feasibly enact.  No-fault divorce seems as though it mainly stems from a desire 
not to be the only state left out, though I do not hesitate to acknowledge that some points, 
such as the freedom to leave a marriage, are important.  However, as Erickson writes 
Perhaps in a perfect world, where both parties to the marriage had 
economic security and equal bargaining power, and where all courts could 
be counted upon to do justice between the parties when determining in 
custody, visitation, support, and equitable distribution of marital property, 
the freedom to choose to leave a marriage could be elevated above the 
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other partner’s desire to continue the marriage.  Unfortunately, we do not 
live in a perfect world.86
 
It is imperative that the above reforms be enacted prior to no-fault divorce in New York if 
the goal is to ensure the well-being of both parties involved.  Only then should a 
unilateral no-fault divorce bill be considered and should this debate continue.
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Mandatory Policy Initiatives:  Joint Custody and Mediation 
 
 Recent policy proposals in New York have included bills to mandate joint custody 
and mediation in divorce proceedings.  Supporters include father’s rights groups, while 
opposition stems largely from NOW and women’s groups.  In this chapter, I will examine 
both of these mandatory policy initiatives.  First, I will provide a brief history of custody 
of children following divorce then I will identify the proponents of mandatory joint 
custody and explain their arguments.  Similarly, I will highlight opponents to this policy 
and outline their arguments then I will conclude with my recommendations.  The second 
portion of this chapter will examine the current bill for mandatory mediation in the state 
Senate and Assembly.  I will discuss proponents’ arguments and then opponents’ 
objections to the bill.  Finally, I will finish with my own suggestions. 
Joint Custody 
 
 Historically, custody of the children was an uncontested notion.  Fathers 
preserved all legal rights to their children under patria potestas in ancient Roman law.  In 
the late eighteenth century, however, a shift occurred away from paternal power.  In her 
book, From Father’s Property to Children’s Rights: The History of Child Custody in the 
United States, Mary Ann Mason writes 
In the first hundred years of the new republic, from 1790 to 1890, after the 
end of the colonial period, there was a dramatic shift away from fathers’ 
common law rights to custody and control of their children toward a 
modern emphasis on the best interests of the child, with a presumption in 
favor of mothers as the more nurturing parent.87
 
Women’s increase in property rights and their rising influence within the family structure 
were largely responsible for this change.  In the 1970s, however, “[m]ost states adopted 
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laws conferring equal status on custodial rights of mother and father with a favorable 
attitude toward joint custody.”88  According to Nolo, a company that provides legal 
information resources, joint custody is defined as 
An arrangement by which parents who do not live together share the 
upbringing of a child. Joint custody can be joint legal custody (in which 
both parents have a say in decisions affecting the child)[,] joint physical 
custody (in which the child spends a significant amount of time with both 
parents) or, very rarely, both.89
 
Many states have a preference or presumption of joint custody – some if parents agree, 
others, even if parents do not agree.90  The focus of this half of the chapter will be on the 
debate over presumptive joint custody in New York, which currently has no custody 
mandate of this type.   
According to Joel R. Brandes, a prominent family law attorney and author of the 
nine-volume Law and the Family New York 2d, “nothing in New York’s law prevents a 
court from making any reasonable allocation of the parental rights and obligations, so 
long as the determination is in the best interest of the child.”91  This terminology “best 
interest of the child” came up repeatedly in the literature and there was no uniform 
definition.  Joel R. Brandes, who practices in New York, asserts that many factors are 
taken into consideration and may include: 
The effect of a separation of siblings; The wishes of the child, if of 
sufficient age; The length of time the present custody arrangement has 
continued; Abduction or abandonment of the child or other defiance of 
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legal process; The relative stability of the respective parents; The care and 
affection shown to the child by the parents; The atmosphere in the homes; 
The ability and availability of the parents; The morality of the parents; The 
prospective educational probabilities; The possible effect of a custodial 
change on the children;  The financial standing of the parents; The parents' 
past conduct; The refusal of a parent to permit visitation and/or the 
willingness of a parent to encourage visitation; Unauthorized relocation of 
the parent and child to a distant domicile; Making unfounded accusations 
of child abuse.92
 
Generally, states, including New York, have a statute and established case law for 
patterns in custody disputes.  Domestic Relations Law §240 states that in divorces, “the 
court shall require verification of the status of any child of the marriage with respect to 
such child’s custody and support, including any prior orders, and shall enter orders for 
custody and support as, in the court’s discretion, justice requires, having regard to the 
circumstances of the case and of the respective parties and to the best interests of the 
child.”93  Furthermore, in Braiman v. Braiman (1978), the Court of Appeals of New York 
stated that “[o]f course, whatever the ultimate disposition, it must be, as it has always 
been, in the best interest of the children.”94  Though the doctrine of the best interest of the 
children has been established, its definition has been disputed.  Both proponents and 
opponents of presumptive joint custody argue that they have the best interests of children 
at heart.  There is currently a bill in the New York Assembly, A08627, sponsored by 
Assemblyman Benjamin that would establish a presumption of shared parenting of minor 
children in matrimonial proceedings.95  The bill would provide for joint custody for 
minor children in a divorce, provided that there is not an allegation that this would be in 
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opposition to the best interests of the children.  It states that “continuing contact with both 
parents through shared parenting is in the best interests of minor children.”96  The bill 
also establishes an order of preference for custody, the top preference being joint custody. 
If the court decides against joint custody, it must state its reasons.  It has been referred to 
judiciary twice, once on May 22, 2007 and again on January 9, 2008.  I will now turn to 
look at proponents’ and opponents’ arguments with regard to mandatory joint custody in 
New York and conclude with my own analysis. 
Proponents of Mandatory Joint Custody 
 First, I will examine the justification for A08627 in the text of the bill.  There are 
two primary explanations for the bill’s necessity:  the best interest of children and to 
reduce the stress in divorce.  The second reason is mentioned much more succinctly, thus 
I will reveal this reason first.  The justification states that “[b]ecause presumptive shared 
parenting reduces litigation and re-litigation, it will also reduce the stress inherent in the 
divorce process.”97  The remainder of the text addresses children’s adjustment after 
divorce.  The bill states that “[c]urrent psychological studies, including state sponsored 
projects spanning 38 states, reveal convergent findings that children of all ages have 
better adjustment after divorce when they have full parenting participation from both 
parents.”98  In addition, reports by the National Institute of Mental Health are cited to 
assert that “custody arrangements which effectively remove one parent from a 
child’s life interferes with the child’s normal development.”99  Presumptive joint custody 
would also reject the notion that children should be used as bargaining chips.  The bill 
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also denies the claim that voluntary joint custody is enough because Assemblyman 
Benjamin argues in the current system without a presumption of joint custody, 
“[s]tatistics have shown that in more than 95% of divorce or separation cases, the mother 
was awarded sole custody of the child, with the father limited to rights of visitation.”100  
Essentially, the bill’s justification relies upon the claims that children will be better off 
psychologically and mentally, and joint custody is rare in its current voluntary status. 
 Father’s rights groups examine the issue with a similar definition of children’s 
interests in mind.  These organizations formed in the wake of feminism because many 
men felt their rights were in jeopardy.  Father’s rights groups assist fathers in preserving 
what they deem to be best for men and children.  In New York, these organizations 
include Father’s Rights Association of New York State, The Coalition of Fathers and 
Families NY, Inc., and several attorneys, such as Rinaldo Del Gallo III, who advocate for 
father’s rights.  I will focus on two proponents of presumptive joint custody, Mike 
McCormick, Executive Director of the American Coalition for Fathers and Children, the 
world’s largest shared parenting organization, and Glenn Sacks, a columnist on men and 
fathers’ issues.  I chose these men because both of them have written on and spoken out 
about New York’s legislative proposal for mandatory joint custody.  Their main 
arguments are that the bill “will help reduce post-divorce conflict and greatly improve the 
lives of New York’s children of divorce.”101
 Like the bill’s justification, father’s rights proponents’ prime argument is that 
joint custody is the best psychological, mental, and emotional solution for children.  In a 
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joint piece about A330,102 the failed shared parenting bill in 2006, McCormick and Sacks 
cite several studies to buttress their claims.  They refer to the findings of a meta-analysis 
of 33 studies between 1982 to 1999 that examined 1,846 sole-custody and 814 joint-
custody children conducted by psychologist Robert Bauserman and published by the 
American Psychological Association’s Journal of Family Psychology:  “children in joint 
custody settings had fewer behavior and emotional problems, higher self-esteem, better 
family relations, and better school performance than children in sole custody 
arrangements.”103  They also cite studies focusing on effects on academics following 
divorce:  “A Harvard University study of 517 families conducted across a four-and-a-half 
year period measured depression, deviance, school effort, and school grades in children 
ranging in age from 10 to 18.  The researchers found that the children in joint custody 
settings fared better in these areas than those in sole custody.”104  They also quote a study 
by psychologist Joan Kelly to indicate that children of divorce are more satisfied with 
joint physical custody than sole custody. 
 Another argument McCormick and Sacks use for presumptive joint custody is that 
“[r]esearch demonstrates that joint custody also leads to high rates of child support 
compliance” because parents are more involved in their children’s lives.105  This is a 
potentially appealing argument particularly to mothers and children.  McCormick and 
Sacks also point to the costly legal battles in which non-custodial parents must engage in 
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order to seek time with their children.  They also reject the notion that joint custody 
creates a confusing rearing environment for children.  They claim that “[r]esearch shows 
that children fare best in the stability of a married, two parent household” but after a 
divorce, the best environment is to “protect their critical bonds with the two people they 
love most in the world – their mother and their father.”106
 McCormick and Sacks also specifically reject women’s groups’ claims that joint 
custody does not work when there is conflict between parents.  They cite a study in the 
Journal of Divorce & Remarriage that finds that “over time joint custody serves to help 
reduce conflict between divorced spouses” and another study by Texas Women’s 
University that indicates that “joint custody does not expose children to greater parental 
conflict.”107  They also address concerns over protecting divorcing women who have 
been victims of domestic violence.  They assert that “A330’s presumption of joint 
custody only applies to fit parents – abused women would receive sole custody.”108
 Many father’s rights advocates also discuss what’s called parental alienation 
syndrome (PAS).  In his article “Parental Alienation Syndrome vs. Parental Alienation:  
Which Diagnosis Should Evaluators Use in Child-Custody Disputes?” Richard Gardner 
defines PAS as  
a childhood disorder that arises almost exclusively in the context of child-
custody disputes. Its primary manifestation is the child’s campaign of 
denigration against a parent, a campaign that has no justification. It results 
from the combination of a programming (brainwashing) parent’s 
indoctrinations and the child’s own contributions to the vilification of the 
target parent. When true parental abuse and/or neglect is present, the 
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child’s animosity may be justified and so the parental alienation syndrome 
explanation for the child’s hostility is not applicable.109
 
Essentially, PAS is perpetrated by one parent who wishes to isolate the child from the 
other parent, usually the non-custodial parent.  The Parental Alienation Awareness 
Organization (PAAO) was founded on the basis that most people do not know about 
PAS, despite their claims that it is a legitimate disorder.  Father’s rights groups cite PAS 
as a basis for the need to keep children with both parents so brainwashing will not occur. 
Opponents of Presumptive Joint Custody 
 While father’s rights groups are at the forefront of advocating for presumptive 
joint custody, women’s rights groups are actively fighting the passage of bills for 
mandatory shared parenting.  The New York State chapter of the National Organization 
for Women is at the head of this debate with Stop Family Violence and the National 
Coalition for Family Justice behind it.  NOW claims that Braiman v. Braiman is good 
precedent and should not be overturned and that children are hurt by presumptive joint 
custody since conflict is likely present between the parents.  NOW favors a primary 
caregiver presumption, which would award custody to the parent who has been the 
principal caregiver. 
 NOW cites that in Braiman v. Braiman (1978), the Court of Appeals of New York 
wrote, “Children need a home base. Particularly where alternating physical custody is 
directed, such custody could, and would generally, further the insecurity and resultant 
pain frequently experienced by the young victims of shattered families.”110  The opinion 
continues by stating that “[i]t is understandable, therefore, that joint custody is 
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encouraged primarily as a voluntary alternative for relatively stable, amicable parents 
behaving in mature civilized fashion….As a court-ordered arrangement imposed upon 
already embattled and embittered parents, accusing one another of serious vices and 
wrongs, it can only enhance familial chaos.”111  NOW highlights this ruling to emphasize 
that the voluntary nature of joint custody is crucial to its success as a custody 
arrangement. 
 NOW also asserts that lawmakers need to look at other states that have adopted 
presumptive joint custody and the effects that occurred there in order to better assess 
what will happen if New York adopts the measure.  They specifically focus on 
California’s adoption of mandated joint custody.  They assert that “[a]fter seeing the 
effects on children:  convoluted living arrangements between relocated, possibly 
remarried parents, children being transferred from parent to parent in front of police 
stations, children being enrolled in two separate schools and other horror stories, the 
California legislature, in 1989, revoked its presumption.”112  California’s current statute 
“now establishes ‘neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal 
custody, joint physical custody, or sole custody, but allows the Court and the family the 
widest discretion to choose a parenting plan which is in the best interest of the children or 
children’”113  California NOW issued a report entitled “Disorder in the Courts,” within 
which was a piece entitled “Joint Custody – A Failed Proposition for Women, 
Children…and Loving Fathers.”  In this article, Trish Wilson, a writer and member of the 
National Network on Family Law Policy, cites a study by Maccoby and Mnookin that 
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found that “when joint custody is ordered to resolve custody disputes, three years later 
the couples experienced more conflict and less cooperative parenting than couples for 
whom joint custody was the first choice of each parent.”114  California NOW also asserts 
that presumptive joint custody fails to create individualized solutions and instead “caters 
to a minority of fathers who demand it.”115  California NOW cites a study by Dr. Judith 
Wallerstein that indicates that joint custody is “harmful to children who cannot handle the 
restrictive schedule….They lose track of their friends and their extracurricular activities 
suffer when parents pay too much attention to when the children are supposed to be with 
them rather than on what their children would like to do with their own time.”116
 Both California NOW and New York NOW point out that 95% of divorcing 
parents reach an agreement on custody arrangements without court intervention.  For the 
court to presume joint custody is the best arrangement is to trounce on the wishes of 
negotiating parents, which make up the vast majority of separating couples.  Many 
parents do not choose joint custody as the solution, and instead opt for custody with a 
primary caregiver for the children, often the mother.117  NOW stresses that joint custody 
works when it is voluntary.  They state that in the cases in which joint custody bodes well 
for children, all of the following are present:  
the parents had an amicable relationship, their divorce was amicable with 
little or no conflict, they had higher-than-average incomes, they had only 
one child, neither parent (especially the father) had remarried, they lived 
within close proximity of each other, they had flexible job schedules, the 
child could handle the joint custody arrangement, the parents chose freely 
between themselves to try joint custody and they chose to make it work.118
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These circumstances are not present in all cases, and thus NOW asserts that the current 
system of individualized assessment works best for families. 
 NOW also questioned the effect that presumptive joint custody would have on 
domestic violence victims.  NOW asserts that 95% of separating parents reach voluntary 
custody agreements and “[o]f the five percent of custody cases that do involve courtroom 
battles, at least three quarters of them involve domestic violence.”119  NOW claims that 
the “[a]busers often use ongoing, costly litigation – seeking joint or sole custody – as a 
tactic to continue the abuse and to punish the mother for leaving.”120  In addition, they 
cite a 2002 study of NYS Family Courts, which found that courts “never or rarely 
responded by denying visitation when there is a risk of violence.”121  NOW and Stop 
Family Violence argue that Sacks and McCormick acknowledge that abusers should not 
have custody yet “they are promoting mandatory arrangements that will hamstring the 
choices of almost all separating families in order to benefit, at most, only 1.25% of them 
[the number of contested custody cases that do not involve domestic violence].”122  NOW 
also asserts that marital violence is a “statistically significant predictor of physical child 
abuse,”123 thus strengthening the argument that those abusive in a marriage are likely to 
inflict harm onto children should they be placed in their custody. 
NOW also rejects the validity of PAS.  They point out that PAS is not recognized 
by the American Psychological Association or any valid psychological or psychiatric 
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association and it has only received validity in custody case law.124  They also assert that 
it can be harmful in proceedings:  “Because of the widespread acceptance in the courts of 
PAS (Parental Alienation Syndrome) mothers are afraid even to raise the issue of child 
abuse for fear of losing custody and possibly even visitation.”125
NOW advocates for primary caregiver presumption, which would award custody 
to the parent who has been the principal caregiver of the children during the marriage.  In 
a 2006 editorial in the Times Union, NOW-NYS President Marcia Pappas reasons, “If a 
person is not involved in the lives of his or her children during the marriage, why would 
that involvement increase after divorce?”126  Pappas asserts that this policy “would cut 
down on the abusive practice by the moneyed spouse (usually the husband) of coercing 
the non-moneyed spouse (usually the wife) to make monetary concessions rather than 
risk a custody battle before a biased court.”127  She also divulges that Richard Neely, a 
lawyer in West Virginia “has acknowledged that he often gave that advice to male 
clients.  When he became chief justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals in West 
Virginia, he was responsible for the passage of a primary caregiver bill.”128  In addition, 
NOW points to California’s experience with mandating joint custody.  Pappas writes: 
In California, one of the first states to mandate joint custody, a report 
prepared fifteen years after divorce reform legislation, found in joint and 
sole custody arrangements followed up two and three years after the initial 
filing that the children’s contact with their parents varied considerably 
across custody types. One-third of joint-physical custody arrangements 
were indistinguishable in sole custody –visitation arrangements in the 
same population. ‘There is evidence that under appropriate circumstances 
parents and children benefit under joint custody arrangements after 
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divorce. There are, however, critical differences between voluntary joint 
custody arrangements and court-imposed joint custody over the reluctance 
of one parent.’ This concern extended to mediation-influenced joint 
custody. After seeing the harm wrought by court-ordered joint custody,  
such as, among other things, children attending two different schools, 
California ended its official bias in favor of joint custody awards on 
January 1, 1989, stating that ‘Proponents of joint custody argue that court-
imposed joint custody encourages battling parents to work things out 
between themselves, but this assumption is based more on wishful 
thinking than reality’129
 
California is an example of a state that instituted presumptive joint custody but later 
realized the harm from a mandate in all family situations.  Joint custody is not an 
automatic fix for custody disputes and to assert so is “wishful thinking,” as California 
found.  
Recommended Course of Action 
 Organizations on both sides of this issue are obviously passionate about their 
points of view.  The debate largely revolves around three primary issues:  the best interest 
of the children (including whether joint custody works when there is conflict between 
parents), the effect on domestic violence victims, and the validity of PAS.  There is also 
the fundamental question of what might change if joint custody is mandated rather than 
remains voluntary. 
 There are studies supporting both claims that joint custody is best for the children 
and that sole custody is best.  For instance, a study consisting of a child interview and 
parent questionnaire of 133 children found that “[c]hildren in joint custody arrangement 
reported a significantly greater number of positive experiences than children in maternal 
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custody.” 130  However, certain behaviors by parents may indicate that joint custody may 
not be in the child’s best interest.  Ira Daniel Turkat writes that “literature reveals a 
growing number of reports that many divorced and divorcing parents are not able to 
cooperate in the ways intended by the courts.”131  In a separate article, Turkat quotes 
B.A. Coates’s book Divorce with Decency:   
The problem is well-illustrated by Coates (1999, p. 13), who reported data 
from a series of 10,000 divorces: ‘... 35% of our cases involve at least one 
party who really hates the other’s guts and wants a prolonged fight to the 
death.’  He further noted (Coates, 1999, p. 14) that more than 50% of 
parents ‘... remain fanatically angry at one another more than a decade 
following their divorce.’132
 
This study indicates that animosity between parents is a serious concern and a reality for 
many couples undergoing divorce, and this chaos would not bode well for children.  
Studies are present on both sides of the issue, and one study even indicated that joint or 
sole custody arrangements did not affect children’s post-divorce adjustment.133   
Robert Bauserman’s meta-analysis, published by the American Psychological 
Association’s Journal of Family Psychology and cited by McCormick and Sacks, argues 
for joint custody’s benefits for child development.  It potentially offers a comprehensive 
review of the literature in order to determine if and how child adjustment is impacted by 
joint and sole custody arrangements.  However, his critique has received some criticism.  
Trish Wilson offers a lengthy critique of Bauserman’s meta-analysis.  She writes, “One 
major error in his meta-analysis was in not adequately defining joint custody, especially 
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joint physical custody.  Joint physical custody, for instance, does not equal ‘50/50 
parenting.’”134  She explains that “[t]here is no differentiation between parents who split 
or rotate custody of their children as opposed to other forms of joint custody. In split 
custody, for example, mom has primary physical custody of one child and dad has 
primary physical custody of another” and Bauserman has not differentiated between these 
different types of custody.135  Wilson also criticizes Bauserman’s selection of studies:  
“His method of selection alone severely limited his scope. It left him a total of 33 studies, 
11 published and 22 unpublished. 21 of the unpublished studies were doctoral 
dissertations. Out of his two and 1/3 pages of references, only about 25 of the studies 
were dated post 1990.”136  These criticisms raise concerns over the widespread 
applicability of Bauserman’s meta-analysis and it appears that both groups may find 
studies to support their claims. 
 Domestic violence victims who attempt to leave their husbands are often 
extremely vulnerable in the negotiation process.  Father’s rights groups acknowledge that 
this would be one of the exceptions to mandatory joint custody, and NOW agrees that in 
cases of domestic violence, joint custody arrangements are never appropriate.  However, 
NOW claims that this is not always addressed in the courts currently, even without a 
presumption of joint custody.  The study cited by NOW by the NYS Family Courts which 
found that courts “never or rarely responded by denying visitation when there is a risk of 
violence”137 was alarming and research indicates that the risk for violence escalates when 
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a woman leaves an abusive relationship.  Hardesty and Chung cite a 1998 study that 
found that “[c]ompared to married women, divorced women…were 2.5 times more likely 
to experience violence in the past year, and separated women were 6.5 times more likely 
to experience violence.”138  Hardesty and Chung also assert that “there is no system for 
routinely identifying abused women during the divorce process” and women may not 
volunteer information about abuse.  When they do divulge abuse during a divorce, “they 
frequently are not supported by their attorneys or the courts may evoke hostile relations” 
and additionally (corroborating the Family Courts finding) “custody and visitation were 
rarely denied to parents with protective orders against them.”139  These are very serious 
concerns about the enforcement of protections for domestic violence victims if 
presumptive joint custody were to be adopted. 
 Furthermore, the debate over PAS seems unfounded.  The syndrome is not 
recognized by any psychological or psychiatric organization and a review of the literature 
reveals that there are serious empirical concerns with its validity.  Jennifer Hoult 
conducted “a comprehensive analysis of the science, law, and policy issues involved in 
PAS’s evidentiary admissibility.”140  She examines the precedent-setting cases, the 
writings of PAS’s originator Richard Gardner, and the policy issues associated with PAS.  
Hoult concludes that there are no meaningful peer-reviewed articles to verify empirical 
support for PAS and that PAS’s diagnosis error rate is unacceptably high.  Carol Bruch, 
research professor of law at University of California Davis, also criticizes PAS.  Among 
several reasons she cites is that “Gardner confounds a child’s developmentally related 
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reaction to divorce and high parental conflict (including violence) with psychosis. In 
doing so, he fails to recognize parents’ and children’s angry, often inappropriate, and 
totally predictable behavior following separation.”141  This raises serious questions about 
the diagnoses that Gardner proposes.  In addition, Bruch also asserts that “PAS shifts 
attention away from the perhaps dangerous behavior of the parent seeking custody to that 
of the custodial parent. This person, who may be attempting to protect the child, 
is instead presumed to be lying and poisoning the child.”142  Children of parents in a 
violent relationship are especially vulnerable to this charge.  A mother attempting to 
protect her children from an abusive husband may be suspected of trying to alienate the 
children from the parents, despite the violence.  It is not clear why the courts have 
allowed PAS in the face of serious doubts.  Hoult suggests that PAS became a way “to 
reduce these complex, time-consuming, and wrenching evidentiary investigations to 
medical diagnoses.”143 Without empirical data and no recognition by the American 
Psychological Association, it can be concluded that PAS should not be a factor in 
examining presumptive joint custody.144
 My principal concern in mandating joint custody is the one-size-fits-all effect.  If 
95% of separating couples reach a custody agreement currently, why is there a need to 
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mandate joint custody?  Why increase the amount of litigation to prove that the 
arrangement of sole custody, for example, is actually best for the couple?  The state 
should not impose its mandatory policy on all couples for all situations.  In her book 
Second Chances, Judith Wallerstein writes, 
Joint custody can be helpful in families where it has been chosen 
voluntarily by both parents and is suitable for the child. But there is no 
evidence to support the notion that ‘one size fits all’ or even most. There 
is, in fact, a lot of evidence for the idea that different custody models are 
suitable for different families. The policy job ahead is to find the best 
match for each family. Sadly, when joint custody is imposed by the court 
on families fighting over custody of children the major consequences of 
the fighting are shifted onto the least able members of the family--the 
hapless and helpless children. The children can suffer serious 
psychological injury when this happens.145
 
Likewise, in her review of the literature and arguments for and against joint custody, Lita 
Linzer Swartz concluded:  “After reviewing the arguments and factors presented, one can 
only conclude that there is no one answer best for all children or for all dissolved 
families.  Child custody determinations must be made on a case-by-case basis rather than 
as a statutory preference.”146  Furthermore, the Matrimonial Commission was established 
by Chief Judge Judith S. Kaye in January 2004 to “examine every facet of the divorce 
and custody determination process and recommend reforms to reduce trauma, delay and 
cost to parents and children so personally impacted by the system.”147  The Commission 
concluded that “no presumptions regarding the awarding of custody whatsoever should 
be created by legislation, case law or otherwise”148 with “the hope and expectation that 
well-trained, competent judges would evaluate each individual case and each individual 
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child’s needs without prejudice.”149  This Commission, created by the Court 
Administration, offers a recommendation free from any ulterior motivations and their 
conclusion bolsters my recommendation that joint custody not be a presumptive policy.  
Elizabeth Scott, Professor at University of Virginia, argues that “the inquiry regarding 
future custody arrangements should focus on the past relationship of each parent to the 
child and do so in a more precise and individualized way.”150  She elaborates by arguing: 
“If all, or even most, parents fully shared child care responsibilities, a joint custody rule 
would reflect a normative consensus about egalitarian parental roles.  We are not at that 
point.”151  Indeed, the literature reveals that there is a not a need to mandate joint 
custody; rather it should be left for the couples to decide, and in the small number of 
cases where that cannot be resolved, the unique dynamics of the case should be 
evaluated.  This will ensure that all parties’ interests are best served. 
Mandatory Mediation 
 A second mandated policy that has recently gained attention in New York is that 
of mandatory mediation.  Mediation is defined by Anthony M. Lanzone, who has 
contributed to many alternative dispute resolution (ADR) panels, as “a non-binding, 
confidential dispute resolution process before one or more third party neutrals.”152  It 
dates back to the early 1970s through the 1980s: “as dissatisfaction with the judicial 
system mounted” and the backlog of cases grew, “state legislatures began to seek 
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alternative methods of resolving legal disputes.”153  Senator Perkins introduced a bill for 
mandated mediation in the New York Senate and Assemblyman Robinson introduced the 
identical bill in the Assembly.  The bill 
[c]reates the parent-mediation program for child custody disputes; requires 
parents, who were in a dispute over the custody of their child or children, 
to participate in a court sponsored mediation program; provides that the 
mediator would be responsible for submitting the results of the process to 
the court, which in turn would enter an appropriate custody and support 
order.154
 
This bill would stipulate that if parents could not come to an agreement about the 
custody of their child or children, the court would mandate that parents participate in a 
court sponsored mediation program.  The mediator would then present the outcome to the 
court and then the court would make a court order resolving the issue.  Current New York 
law does not make mediation mandatory and if the couple elects to participate, one or 
both parties pay for the process.155  There are currently no official requirements with 
regard to who may act as a mediator.  The bill was referred to judiciary twice, once on 
January 24, 2007 and again on January 9, 2008.  The proponents of mandatory mediation 
in New York are not as visible as for no-fault divorce or for mandatory joint custody.  
This perhaps speaks to its lack of progress in the legislative arena.  Thus, in lieu of 
focusing on one or two specific groups, I will present the arguments that I have found in 
the bill and select literature for enacting mandatory mediation.  I will then discuss 
NOW’s opposition to the policy and conclude with my own recommendations. 
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In Favor of Mandatory Mediation 
 The justification for A3458, the bill in the Assembly, emphasizes the best interest 
of the children and asserts that mandatory mediation enforces this doctrine.  
Assemblyman Robinson writes, “New York State Family Courts are inundated with child 
custody cases that are often very contentious.  With the large influx of child custody 
cases within the court system, decisions may be made hastily and the best interests of the 
child (or children) involved may not be fully considered.”156  The large docket of the 
court encourages speedy decisions that may not allow for proper attention to the children, 
and mediation provides the environment for more time and consideration.  The 
justification also includes the claim that stress on parents will be mitigated by mediation:  
“The parent-mediation program offers an opportunity to settle child custody disputes 
amicably. It would allow parents the opportunity to gain more control over parental 
arrangements, as well as determining what is best for their child (or children).”157  
Robinson also asserts that child custody mediation programs have been successfully 
implemented in other states, such as California, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania.  In 
these states, mediation offers “a neutral setting where each person’s right to due process 
and confidentiality is protected, and the needs of the children can be met.”158
 Legally, there is some precedent for a court to order mandatory mediation.  In his 
article, “Mandatory Mediation in Joint Parenting Agreements:  IRMO Duffy [the court 
case],” Patrick J. Ahern wrote that “the 2nd District Appellate Court held that in a joint 
custody case mandatory mediation of child custody issues can be ordered by the trial 
court if the dispute resolution provision of the joint parenting agreement failed to require 
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mediation.”159  In this case, “the appellate court looked to other jurisdictions where 
mandatory mediation was approved by trial courts in custody and visitation disputes. The 
Missouri Court of Appeals found that mediation reduces the friction inherent in most 
custody arrangements and is necessary for successful ‘shared parenting’ in joint custody 
situations.”160  Essentially, the court cited Missouri Court of Appeals’ reasoning that 
mediation helps to reduce conflict and is “necessary” for proper joint custody 
arrangements.  The court, however, also noted that “[m]andatory mediation would also 
not be appropriate where factors existed which would have likely precluded joint custody 
such as a history of abuse or an inability to cooperate between the parties.”161
 An additional argument for mandatory mediation in general, not specific to 
custody disputes, is that voluntary mediation is not currently used enough.  People’s first 
inclination is to see their lawyer, not to mediate, and “[t]here is an unspoken resistance to 
alternative dispute resolution that derives in part from the tendency instilled by our 
[lawyers’] adversarial training to distrust alternative forms of consciousness, such as a 
focus on solving the problem rather than winning the case.”162  By mandating the 
process, the benefits may be realized by more parties. 
In Opposition to Mandatory Mediation 
 NOW-NYS strongly opposes mandating mediation in the New York court system.  
They focus on power considerations between the parties, the pressure mediation causes, 
mediation’s tendency toward joint custody, and domestic violence victims. 
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 NOW claims that in order “[t]o be effective, mediation should take place when 
there is equality of power between the parties.”163  They assert that women are often at 
the weaker end of a marriage since they are either employed in an economy that still pays 
women 77 cents for every dollar a man makes or at home as the primary caregivers of 
children “thereby relinquishing their ability to acquire incomes reasonable enough to 
retain an attorney or other experts to represent them in court.”164  NOW cites a 2007 
study from the Howard Samuels Center that finds “only 61.6% of women with children 
work full-time as compared to 87.1% of men” and “the earnings of these women are 
equivalent to only 69% of their male counterpart’s earnings.”165  The number of women 
who receive full pay while on maternity leave has also decreased:  from twenty-seven 
percent in 1998 to eighteen percent in 2005, according to the 2005 National Study of 
Employers.166  This unequal access to financial resources thus translates into unequal 
bargaining power in mediation, according to NOW.  Furthermore, NOW argues that 
mediators, in an effort to settle the case, “exert pressure on the weaker party (usually the 
mother) to yield to the more dominant spouse (usually the father).”167  This further puts 
women at a disadvantage in mediation, and to mandate the process would only make 
these inequities more widespread. 
 In addition, NOW asserts that “[a]lmost all mediated agreements provide for joint 
custody or ‘shared parenting’ without consideration of the best interest of the 
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children.”168  In essence, mandating mediation is akin to mandating joint custody due to 
the frequency with which it is the outcome of mediation, and as discussed previously in 
this chapter, joint custody as an overarching policy without individualized consideration 
is problematic. 
 NOW is also concerned about how mandatory mediation would affect victims of 
domestic violence.  They point out that the bill does not provide an exemption in cases of 
domestic violence and abused women certainly do not have an equal bargaining ground.  
Intimidation of victims is only further exacerbated by mediation, NOW argues, and the 
threat of violence is real:  “seventy percent of all instances of domestic violence in a 
marriage occur after the couple has separated.”169  They also argue that even if a bill were 
proposed that included an exemption for domestic violence, there are still serious doubts 
about the screening process for domestic violence.  NOW questions, “What level of 
specialized knowledge and training will be required of staff or those conducting the 
screening?”170  They are doubtful of the current system’s ability to adequately detect 
domestic violence and properly exempt these parties from mediation.  These reservations 
stem from the fact that mediators are not required to receive formal training on domestic 
violence issues and without an attorney present, women, including the most vulnerable 
abused women, may not be advised of their legal rights. 
 NOW also questions the credentials of mediators.  There are no formal 
requirements for who may act as a mediator and they wonder, “Will mediators truly have 
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the expertise necessary to reach equitable agreements between parties?”171  They also 
point out that most cases are settled outside of court, so to force the most disagreeable 
parties into mediation is antithetical to the basis of mediation.  Rather than further 
encourage this process, NOW would like to see the hiring of “additional in-court 
personnel who would try to obtain settlements within the court system, with attorneys 
present and with transcribed proceedings,” called “case management.”172  Case 
management, NOW asserts, is “a more fair-minded, impartial, and evenhanded means to 
achieve agreement between the parties.”173  In this process 
the court or tribunal takes responsibility and initiatives to facilitate 
prompt, economical and fair processing of cases from commencement to 
final disposition. An important purpose of a case management system is to 
eliminate delay as a party tactic. Another important purpose is the exercise 
of discipline by the courts so as to limit procrastination by parties or their 
lawyers by forcing good preparation and effective settlement strategies 
early in the case. 
 
They argue that this would be more impartial and help to provide equal bargaining power 
to the parties. 
Recommendations 
 Mandatory mediation in custody disputes appears to lack empirical evidence that 
would enable suggesting its adoption would be beneficial.  Reducing the docket seems to 
serve the courts more than the parties involved since even if decisions are made hastily 
now, that does not necessarily mean that they would be better addressed in mediation.  
Trina Grillo asserts that “[o]ften, the time allotted to a mandatory mediation is short.”174  
She cites a study of the Connecticut, Los Angeles, and Minneapolis court-related custody 
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mediation systems that showed that cases averaged 1.5 sessions and 2.3 hours in 
Connecticut, 1.7 and 3.0 hours in Los Angeles, and 3.3 sessions and 4.3 hours in 
Minneapolis.  She also asserts that “[i]n contrast to court-ordered mediations, voluntary 
integrated mediations (mediations involving all aspects of the dispute, not just the child 
custody issue) studied by Joan Kelly averaged ten sessions.”175  This calls into question 
whether required mediation will provide a better environment to settle disputes. 
 Mandatory mediation also takes away power from the parties.  Grillo asserts that 
“[w]hen mandatory mediation is part of the court system, the notion that the parties are 
actually making their own decisions is purely illusory”176 since they haven’t chosen the 
process, haven’t been able to determine lawyer’s participation, and haven’t chosen the 
mediator.  For the state to require mediation presupposes that it knows better than 
couples.  As stated, the majority of cases are decided outside of court-ordered processes, 
and to mandate mediation would impose the state into cases in which this is not 
necessary. 
 The power imbalance of the spouses is exacerbated by mandatory mediation.  In 
her piece “Custody Mediation in the United States:  Empowerment of Social Control?” 
Linda K. Girdner argues that a mediator’s ideology informs how they mediate and a 
controlling mediator acknowledges that “equality of bargaining power between men and 
women is not the focus of a cooperative system.  The system is designed to promote the 
child’s interest.”177  In ignoring the power imbalance, a mediator can leave women in a 
vulnerable position, especially since joint custody is often the outcome of mediation. 
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(Some mediators even admit that they see joint custody as the goal of mediation.)178  An 
abused wife is vulnerable to this power imbalance and in mediation, she lacks an attorney 
in order to strengthen her position.  The ability of the mediator to detect domestic 
violence is questionable as well since they are not required to undergo specific training in 
this area.  In a non-random sample of 149 couples, Richard D. Mathis and Zoe Tanner 
found that “57% of all agreements between violent couples specified a form of shared 
custody, which is thought to promote too much future contact between the violent ex-
spouses….wives need violence screening and special protective intervention measures to 
successfully negotiate safer, more restrictive sole custody agreements.”179  In addition, 
Grillo notes that Donald Saposnek studied the California court mediation process and 
found “pathological liars who fooled everybody into believing that they were reasonable 
people and wonderful parents.”180  Grillo admits that this could still be the case in court, 
but “in an informal process where nothing they say can be disproved, [liars] are in a 
much stronger position.” 181
 Especially troubling is the fact that New York has no formal requirements for 
who may act as a mediator.  This seriously calls into question the arguments to mandate a 
process to provide power to someone who may not have the proper credentials to 
evaluate a custody dispute.  Mediation’s tendency toward joint custody (as cited by  the 
Illinois Court of Appeals) is also troubling since it appears that there is more emphasis on 
settling and dividing up children, rather than considering what may be best and most 
financially feasible in the long-run for families.  In addition, the financial implications of 
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the bill are “to be determined” according to the bill’s text.  This is vague and needs more 
attention before consideration of adoption. 
 Mandatory mediation has many problematic aspects.  Most salient are its lack of 
requirements for formally trained mediators, the process’s power imbalance between the 
spouses, and its lack of exemption for domestic violence victims.  While the Matrimonial 
Commission of New York cites many positives of mediation, they steadfastly 
recommended “that the decision to refer a case to mediation, an early settlement panel, a 
parent coordinator or a combination of these should be by stipulation of 
both parties or at the judge’s discretion.”  Requiring mediation would not only be 
unnecessary in most cases, but may be harmful in some, especially in those where abuse 
is present.  At this time and with this bill, mandatory mediation is not recommended in 
New York. 
Mandatory Policies in New York 
 Before enacting either mandatory joint custody or mandatory mediation, it is 
imperative that substantial consideration be given to the empirical research and the 
possible effects.  This especially applies to children and abused wives, two of the most 
vulnerable groups in divorce proceedings.  To mandate policies removes the initial 
encouragement for parties to negotiate agreements among themselves.  It is my 
recommendation, therefore, to oppose mandatory joint custody and mandatory mediation 
in New York unless the concerns I have outlined in this chapter are adequately addressed. 
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Gender Bias in the New York State Court System 
 
No matter the sex, race, ethnicity, or sexual orientation of the defendant, the 
courts purport to treat her or him identically.  However, the courts are not always free of 
discrimination; one such form of prejudice is gender bias.  The Judicial Council Advisory 
Committee on Gender Bias in California defines gender bias as “behavior or decision-
making which is based on or reveals stereotypical attitudes about the nature and roles of 
men and women; perceptions of their relative worth; or myths and misconceptions about 
the social and economic realities encountered by both sexes.”182  The Task Force on 
Gender Issues in Michigan defines gender bias as “the tendency to think about and 
behave toward others primarily on the basis of their sex.  It is reflected in attitudes and 
behavior toward women and men which are based on stereotypical beliefs about the ‘true 
nature,’ ‘proper role’ and other ‘attributes’ of the gender.”183  Though these are more 
formal definitions of gender bias, the important element that I seek to highlight and show 
here is women’s disadvantages in the courts. 
Why should we care about gender bias?  The Judicial Council of California 
provides three reasons.  The Council argues that a courtroom free of gender bias is the 
right thing to do since it “enhances respect for the Court and the law, fosters respect for 
the equality of both sexes, and promotes respect by participants for each other, leading to 
increased civility in the courtroom.”184  Secondly, they cite that it is the law in California, 
as specified by the California Code of Judicial Ethics.  Many states have similar 
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provisions, including New York, which has a Code of Judicial Conduct (22 NYCRR Part 
100.3 (B)).  The third reason to eliminate gender bias in the courts is that it is time.  Many 
state task forces have been created in the last 25 years and they have conducted statewide 
studies to recommend the implementation of changes.  California, for example, 
conducted a study along with recommendations, all of which have not yet been enacted. 
The problem of gender bias began to attract the attention of actors in the court in 
the 1970s and early 1980s.  In response, some state courts began forming gender bias task 
forces to determine to what extent bias was impeding the justice system.  In 1982, Chief 
Justice Robert N. Wilentz of the New Jersey Supreme Court commissioned the first 
gender bias task force.  From this time until the early 1990s, more state task forces were 
created as well, including Florida, Texas, Michigan, California, and New York.185  In 
1992, the Ninth Circuit became the first federal court system to issue a report on gender 
bias in their courts and the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 allowed more federal 
exploration of gender bias in the federal court systems.186  I will draw from some of these 
task forces’ findings to illustrate that gender bias exists. 
This chapter will examine gender bias in three areas (language in the courtroom, 
courtroom practices, and women in the legal profession) with the goal of showing that 
gender bias exists, particularly in New York.  First, I will provide a background of the 
New York Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts and their survey on gender bias.  
Next, examples of gender bias in each of the three areas, including findings from the New 
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York Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts, will be presented.  Next, I will 
provide proposed solutions to the disadvantages that women face in the courtroom.  I will 
then provide findings and solutions from the Truth Commission, which are based on first-
hand experiences of women across eleven states.  Finally, I will conclude with NOW’s 
role and their focus on gender bias.  Here, the goal is to demonstrate that women are 
negatively impacted in the courts and that their experiences need substantially more 
attention. 
New York Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts 
In 1986, the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts found that “[g]ender 
bias against women litigants, attorneys and court employees is a pervasive problem with 
grave consequences.”187  The Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts was created in 
response to the report issued by the task force in order to implement the 
recommendations in the report.  Since 1986, this Committee has 
• Organized numerous educational programs for New York judges. 
• Helped train nonjudicial court personnel. 
• Planned conferences and forums on a wide range of topics. 
• Published pamphlets and books. 
• Issued periodic reports. 
• Conducted surveys and collected data. 
• Advocated for change in court practices and operations that adversely effect 
litigants. 
• Responded to complaints from the public and from advocacy groups. 
• Helped write and implement policies that apply to court employees. 
• Created and nurtured a network of local gender fairness and gender bias 
committees.188 
 
There are currently nineteen members on the Committee, including Chair Hon. Betty 
Weinberg Ellerin, Vice Chair Fern Schair, and Counsel Jill Laurie Goodman.  On their 
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website they provide the contact information for the chairs of local gender bias and 
gender fairness committees as well as useful links such as Legal Information Institute: 
Feminist Jurisprudence, Probono.net, Lawhelp.org, and the Office for the Prevention of 
Domestic Violence.189  The website also includes a link to their publications, two of 
which I will be referencing in this chapter:  “On the Bench: Judicial Responses to Gender 
Bias” and “Fair Speech: Gender Neutral Language in the Courts.”   
In June 2002, the Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts released a seventy-
six page report entitled “Women in the Courts: A Work in Progress 15 Years After the 
Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts.”  In this document, the 
Committee describes the process for assessing bias fifteen years after the New York State 
Task Force was created in 1986: 
the Committee embarked on two projects. First, the Committee used a 
questionnaire to ask those who spend their professional lives in New 
York’s courts their thoughts about change in the past 15 years. The 
Committee also organized a conference, which it titled “The Miles 
Traveled and the Miles Yet To Go,” as another vehicle for exploring the 
extent of progress in the decade and a half since the original 1986 Task 
Force Report.190
 
In late 2000 and early 2001, the Committee distributed about 4000 questionnaires to all 
New York judges and town and village justices, the state’s bar association presidents, law 
school deans, domestic violence advocacy organizations, and New York’s Attorney 
General, among others.  They received approximately 140 survey responses, two-thirds 
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of which were from New York Judges, about half New York State-paid judges and half 
town and village judges.  The survey was  
composed of six open-ended inquiries designed to elicit narrative 
responses on issues central to the 1986 Task Force Report. The questions 
asked respondents about the treatment of women on issues on which the 
1986 Task Force Report had made its most pointed findings: child support 
and divorce; violence against women, both sexual assault and domestic 
violence; assessments of credibility; and opportunities for advancement in 
the profession.191 (Please see Appendix A for the survey questionnaire.) 
 
The 2002 report extensively reports on the findings of the surveys.  Initially, it provides 
recommendations for court administrators, judges, judicial screening committees, the 
legislature, and bar associations and then moves to specific issue areas, such as family 
law, violence against women, and women in the profession, and provides findings along 
with specific recommendations.  The report concludes with many selected responses in 
each issue area that provide a direct indication of the sense of gender bias from those in 
the courts everyday.  For the purposes of this chapter, I will be discussing findings and 
solutions from other task forces and drawing from this comprehensive survey in order to 
emphasize the gender bias experienced by women in the state court system. 
Examples and Findings of Gender Bias 
 The Connecticut Task Force on Gender, Justice, and the Courts found that 
“women are treated differently from men in the justice system and, because of it, many 
suffer from unfairness, embarrassment, emotional pain, professional deprivation and 
economic hardship.”192  Likewise, the Gender Bias Task Force created by the Supreme 
Court of Texas found that “women litigants often experience hostile, demeaning, or 
condescending treatment in the courtroom, and that male litigants are negatively affected 
                                                 
191 Ibid., p. 19. 
192 As cited in Resnik, Judith. 1996. “Asking about Gender in Courts.” Signs 21: 952-90, p. 958. 
     66
by gender stereotypes both in the family law system and in the criminal justice 
system.”193  In this section, I will provide examples and findings from task forces about 
this gender bias with regard to three areas:  biased language, courtroom practices, and 
women in the legal profession. 
One of the reasons that gender bias is difficult to address is because often one 
does not realize that his or her behavior is characteristic of gender bias.  This is 
particularly true in the area of biased language.  Examples of biased language include 
telling an off-color joke in chambers, remarking to a female attorney that her family 
commitments might interfere with her responsibilities to the court, calling a woman by 
her first name but addressing a man as “Mister so-and-so,” referring to a female criminal 
defendant as a bimbo, and making remarks about a woman’s appearance, clothing, 
attractiveness or unattractiveness, either to her face or behind her back.194  Witnesses face 
gender bias in the form of “treating women in such a way as to indicate that their 
opinions or statements are unimportant, irrational, or unduly emotional, referring to 
female witnesses by first names, terms of endearment, or diminutives, addressing female 
expert witnesses as Miss/Mrs./Ms. rather than by an earned title, such as 
Doctor/Professor.”195  It is also important to note that so-called “positive bias” is 
included in gender bias.  Making positive comments about a woman’s appearance and 
addressing the defendant as “hunk.”  All of the above forms of gender biased language 
often occur nonchalantly and without repercussions, thus making it difficult to stop the 
cycle of bias. 
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 Gender bias also manifests itself within courtroom practices in family law and 
violence against women.  In the area of child support, the New York Judicial Committee 
found that “[a]wards of child support are fairer than they were 15 years ago” and 
“[e]nforcement of child support obligations has improved,” yet “[t]he time and multiple 
court appearances often required to pursue these remedies burdens women.”196  Women 
are most affected by this since they are most often the custodial parents and they must 
sacrifice time at their jobs and with their children in order to appear in court.  In addition, 
the Committee found that “[t]he inadequacy of resources in Family Court, where poor 
women are most likely to appear, is severe enough to create conditions that routinely 
deprive litigants of fair, just and timely resolutions of their cases.”197   
In the area of divorce, the New York Judicial Committee found that 
“[m]aintenance awards still are often not adequate to provide financially dependent 
spouses with sufficient support,” “the cost of a divorce is still a major obstacle for women 
who want to end a marriage,” and likewise, “counsel fee awards are often too low to 
provide a level playing field.”198  Furthermore, in 1990, among the many findings of the 
Florida Supreme Court Gender Bias Study Commission were that “men customarily 
retain more than half of the assets of the marriage and leave with an enhanced earning 
capacity”199 and “[w]omen who lack means are routinely denied their statutory right to 
retain competent legal representation.”200   
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 From the standpoint of custody, the New York Judicial Committee concluded that 
“[t]he use of gender-based stereotypes in custody decisions, in general, has lessened in 
the recent past,” but “[v]ictims of domestic violence find that often higher standards of 
parenting are applied to mothers than to fathers.”201   
Bias against domestic violence and sexual assault victims includes regarding these 
crimes “as less serious than other criminal acts,” “minimizing victims’ experiences,” 
“questioning the credibility of female crime victims in ways that the credibility of male 
crime victims is not questioned,” and “blaming victims for causing the abuse or 
assault.”202  Similarly across the board in areas of law, more than twenty jurisdictions 
found that the credibility of women witnesses is “readily questioned”203 and this was also 
found in New York:   “women’s credibility, particularly in domestic violence cases, may 
be subjected to greater scrutiny than that of men.”204  In the area of violence against 
women, the New York survey responses yielded that “[s]ome judges believe that jurors 
apply different and harsher tests of credibility to testimony of rape victims than they do to 
testimony of perpetrators or victims of other crimes” and “[s]ome attorneys and judges 
tend to dismiss applications for orders of protection made during matrimonial cases as 
mere tactical maneuvers.”205
 Furthermore, the treatment of and the lack of women in the legal profession is a 
cause of concern.  The Gender Bias Task Force in Texas found that “women lawyers are 
much more likely than men to be asked if they are attorneys”206 and in the federal courts 
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in the District of Colombia, “about a third of the women lawyers of color reported that a 
judge had questioned their status as lawyers.” 207  One woman wrote, ““I have personally 
been assumed to be a client because I am a woman of color.  My suit did not even ‘tip 
off’ my opposing counsel.”208  In addition, the Texas task force specifically found many 
examples of gender bias toward female attorneys.  They were treated with “rudeness, 
condescension, or contempt” and treated differently than male attorneys based solely on 
their gender.209  Furthermore, “[s]ome attorneys and judges still treat women less 
courteously or respectfully [and] women encounter ‘old boys’ networks and behavior that 
cast them in the role of outsider.”210   
Despite this bias, the New York Judicial Committee found that more women are 
in the legal profession, but they still face obstacles, such as advancement and the fact that 
“time taken from work for child bearing or rearing is perceived as evidence of women’s 
lack of commitment to the legal profession and used against women when decisions are 
made about their careers.”211  In addition, though the number of women in the judiciary 
has increased, there are still a disproportionate number of men as justices.  Just 26% of 
appellate division justices in the New York are women and this figure is only 18% for 
City Court (Outside NYC).  Furthermore, only 17% of the State Supreme Court is made 
up of women.  (Please see Appendix B for the full figures on women in the New York 
justice system.) 
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 These findings overwhelmingly suggest that although there has been progress in 
each of these areas, there is still pervasive gender bias in the New York court system and 
many provisions need to be implemented in order to level the playing field for women. 
Solutions 
 The solutions for these three areas in which gender bias occurs are not the same.  
Addressing bias in custody awards or other areas of family law requires a much different 
approach than addressing the problem of judges calling women “honey.”  Indeed, gender 
bias within the courtroom is its own microcosm, symptomatic of the larger systemic 
gender bias in society.  In many ways, gender bias in the courtroom does not come as that 
much of a surprise when we live in a society that pays women less for doing the same 
work as men, that readily doubts women who are brave enough to come forward when 
sexually assaulted, and that has yet to pass an Equal Rights Amendment, despite the fact 
that it was proposed in 1923.  The following solutions are specific ways to address biased 
language, courtroom practices, and the poor treatment of and lack of women in the legal 
profession, but by no means will they remedy sexism as a whole.  This is an incremental 
process and these solutions should help propel the courts a few steps forward. 
In the area of gender-neutral language, Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge of the 
State of New York, argues for gender-neutral brief-writing on four grounds.  Like the 
Judicial Council of California, Kaye argues that gender-neutral writing is “simply the 
right thing to do.”212  She cites that “researchers have amply established that readers 
encountering masculine words think of men; common sense tells us that would be so.”213  
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Since women are now a consistent aspect of the courtroom, Kaye believes that gender-
specific language is archaic and disrespectful.  Her second point is that “gender-neutral 
writing serves the sheer self-interest of the briefwriter.”214  She argues that since 
gendered language is considered archaic, it could potentially distract the justice from the 
content of the brief and one should avoid cinders.  Third, Kaye argues that gender-neutral 
writing is easy to acquire and internalize.  There are several easy alternatives (as 
previously discussed) to traditionally gendered language.  For instance, instead of saying 
policeman, one could use police officer.  Kaye reasons, “If what is right and correct and 
in one’s self-interest is also easy to do, what can be the countervailing argument?”215  
Finally, Kaye argues that gender-neutral language provides “an example of appropriate 
behavior to the bar generally, as well as to clients and others in society.”216  She asserts 
that lawyers are leaders in society and using fair speech is good for the profession as a 
whole.  Kaye’s arguments along with the Judicial Council of California’s reasons indicate 
that the elimination of gender biased language is motivated by several factors, including 
morality, self-interest, the law, and setting a good example. 
There are several ways to keep a bias-free courtroom.  One easy implementation 
is gender-neutral language not only in brief writing, but also within the courtroom itself.  
In previous years, “man,” “he,” “him,” and other masculine pronouns were assumed to 
include women.  This is no longer the appropriate way to use a singular noun to denote 
people of different genders, and could even create confusion.  The New York State 
Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts cites a notorious case in the Supreme Court 
of the State of Washington which  
                                                 
214 Ibid., p. 14. 
215 Ibid., p. 16. 
216 Ibid., p. 18-19. 
     72
reversed a murder conviction in part because a jury was instructed on the 
‘reasonable man’ standard for a claim of self-defense on behalf of a 5’4” 
woman attacked by a 6’2” man.  In its opinion the Court faulted the 
‘persistent use of the masculine gender’ that left the impression that the 
measure for reasonableness was an altercation between two men.  State v. 
Wanrow, 599 P.2d 548, 558 (1977).217
 
This is obviously just one such circumstance, but it speaks to the issue of clarity, not just 
decency, in adopting gender-neutral language.  There are several specific ways which can 
help to keep a courtroom gender-neutral. 
 Language in the courtroom should be inclusive, rather than in masculine forms.  
For instance, use chair, members of the jury, and colleagues, rather than chairman, 
gentleman of the jury, and brethren.  Examples of positions include police officer, 
firefighter, worker, homemaker, nurse, executive, journalists, representative, Member of 
the Assembly, and Member of Congress or Representative, rather than policeman, 
fireman, workman, housewife, male nurse, businessman, gentlemen of the press, 
spokesman, Assemblyman, Congressman.218
 One should also avoid “he” as a generic pronoun.  In order to do this, the pronoun 
can be eliminated altogether.  For instance, instead of saying “A court clerk can give you 
his advice on that form,” one may state, “A court clerk can give you advice on that 
form.”219  In addition, one can find a neutral article or pronoun, such as “a” or “the,” 
rearrange the sentence to use “who” as the pronoun, replace the pronoun with a synonym, 
or use plural nouns.220
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 The New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts and the Gender 
Bias Reform Implementation Committee from Texas also recommend that consistent 
forms of address be used.  Ms. and Mr. are the correct forms of address when there is not 
another.  Other feminine terms, such as Miss and Mrs., unlike Mr., draw attention to a 
woman’s marital status.  Formal titles, such as Doctor, Officer, or Counselor, should also 
be applied to both men and women. 
 Furthermore, formal, rather than informal, forms of address should be used.  
Women and men should not be called by their first names or other terms such as honey, 
sweetie, little lady, boy, or son since it is patronizing.  Witnesses should be addressed 
with the same formal language.   
Comments about or references to physical appearances, including body parts, 
pregnancy, dress style, or hair style, should be avoided.  The Gender Bias Reform 
Implementation Committee from Texas asserts that “[c]omments on physical appearance 
can be seen as demeaning and put people at a disadvantage by drawing attention to their 
gender rather than the reason for their presence in the court.”221  Furthermore, any jokes 
or remarks with sexual content or any comments, gestures, and touching that may offend 
others should not used in the courthouse.  Some of these may constitute sexual 
harassment and thus should be avoided. 
Judges hold substantial power in the courtroom and set the tone for what conduct 
is acceptable.  As the New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts 
writes, “it is the job of judges to respond decisively, set matters straight, and so secure the 
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fairness of the proceedings before them.”222  The New York State Judicial Committee on 
Women in the Courts published a pamphlet that explores a series of five real life 
scenarios of gender bias that occurred from 1997-1999 with suggested responses from 
New York State trial judges.  I will present two of these scenarios in the area of biased 
language and the responses suggested by sitting judges: 
SCENARIO ONE 
During a calendar call, an attorney, who has been negotiating a 
complicated settlement with an insurance company’s lawyer, asks to be 
heard. She is visibly angry. She tells you that, while discussing the case in 
the hallway outside the courtroom, her adversary has treated her, she says, 
“in a degrading and demeaning fashion.” Before she has a chance to 
expound on the incident—and before you have an opportunity to respond 
in any way—the opposing lawyer interjects, “Your honor, I am sorry if I 
have offended counsel—or should I say counselette—but, hey, she should 
know, if you can’t stand the heat, you’d better get out of the kitchen.” 
 
RESPONSES SUGGESTED BY SITTING JUDGES 
1. Have the attorneys appear in the robing room. On the record the 
participants should state what happened. Opposing counsel should be 
admonished for his comments, made initially, and, if appropriate, for what 
occurred in the hallway. Counsel should be told that any repeat conduct 
will result in the transcripts being forwarded to the disciplinary committee. 
2. “Counselor, I was not privy to what occurred in the hallway. However, 
the comment you have just made in my presence is offensive and 
unprofessional. I am placing you on notice that such comments are not 
acceptable either in or outside the courtroom.” 
3. This is a situation calling for an off-the-record “robing room” 
conference with counsel. First, it is necessary to defuse the obvious 
acrimony between counsel. In the process, it is important for the Court to 
point out to counsel that personal attack–based on gender or any other 
individual qualities–is totally inappropriate and offensive. Second, and 
practically speaking, it is important to help counsel clear the air so that 
settlement may be achieved, and the importance of this practical 
consequence should also be brought to counsels’ attention. 
 
COMMENTARY 
When a lawyer makes this kind of remark, a judge must respond. While 
the precise nature of the response will depend on many things, including 
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the stage in the proceedings, the judge’s relations with the lawyers or the 
lawyers’ relations with each other, a response—immediate and 
unequivocal—is essential. 
 
SCENARIO FOUR 
During a break in the proceedings, while the jury is deliberating, you hear 
two court officers telling sexually offensive jokes. They are talking to each 
other, but nonetheless you hear quite clearly what they are saying. 
 
RESPONSES SUGGESTED BY SITTING JUDGES 
1. I would confront the court officers. While they are in uniform in the 
courtroom they represent the court. Offensive jokes demean the court and 
cause the public to lose confidence in our judicial system. I would have 
them stop. 
2. I would ask them to stop. If the situation occurred again, I would again 
tell them to stop and follow up with a report to their supervisor, if 
appropriate. 
3. Tell them, “A lot of people find that kind of talk offensive...including 
me.” 
 
COMMENTARY 
A response is necessary. If a judge hears conversations of nonjudicial 
personnel, others may as well. The level of response, of course, will 
depend on the particulars of the situation, but neglecting to condemn 
unacceptable behavior creates the risk of appearing to condone it.223
 
Both of these scenarios represent inappropriate conduct in a courtroom setting, one 
through a complaint and another in which a judge directly heard the lewd comments.  
Each suggested response addresses the conduct directly and right away.  It is important to 
note that the judge determines what behavior is appropriate in his or her courtroom and it 
is imperative that scenarios such as these be addressed promptly so that these scenarios 
do not become acceptable conduct.  Biased language multiplies when it is ignored or 
condoned.  A judge must remember the code of judicial conduct which states that “[a] 
judge shall perform judicial duties without bias or prejudice against or in favor of any 
person.”224  Essentially, the Texas Center for Legal Ethics and Professionalism summed 
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up the suggestions well when they asserted that it is imperative to “treat women and men 
with dignity, respect, and attentiveness, mindful of their professional 
accomplishments.”225   
In the area of courtroom practices, the New York Judicial Committee makes 
several recommendations in the fields of family law and violence against women.  The 
New York Judicial Committee recommends that Court Administrators provide more 
opportunities for judges to educate themselves on child support and child custody issues 
and that they “[e]stablish wherever possible evening hours in Family Court and Supreme 
Court for enforcing orders for the payment of child support.”226  In addition, the 
Committee recommends that “[t]he Legislature should enact legislation making interim 
awards of attorney fees mandatory in matrimonial cases” and “Court Administrators 
should assure that the assignment of judges to matrimonial parts is made so that those 
judges are experienced and well-informed about the kinds of issues that arise in such 
matters.”227
The New York Judicial Committee advises that “Court Administrators should 
assure that the annual Judicial Seminars provide meaningful opportunities for judges, 
especially those who are assigned to preside over matters where such issues regularly 
arise, to remain well-informed about the ways that sex-based stereotypes lead to the 
application of higher standards of parenting to mothers than to fathers.”228  The New 
York Judicial Committee also recommends “appropriate funding for Family Court in 
amounts adequate to provide for the efficient, compassionate, and respectful 
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administration of justice” and an increase in the salaries of attorneys assigned to family 
court cases.229
 With specific regard to domestic violence, the New York Judicial Committee 
recommends that all those involved in a domestic violence case have a full understanding 
of both the power dynamics and “[t]he economic difficulties faced by many victims of 
domestic violence and the need for immediate orders of child support and/or 
maintenance.”230  This will likely involve specific education for judges and court 
personnel on these subjects. 
In the area of women in the legal profession, the New York Judicial Committee 
recommends “[e]ncourag[ing] legal employers to adopt employment policies that provide 
flexibility for parents to choose the extent of involvement in raising children without 
prejudice to their careers” and “[e]stablish[ing] programs to encourage senior attorneys to 
act as mentors for women attorneys and law students.”231  In order to show women court 
professionals the respect they deserve, the Texas task force recommends that instead of 
questioning a woman about her profession, a question that applies to everyone should be 
used, such as “Will all attorneys please identify themselves to the court?”232  Finally, the 
New York Judicial Committee concluded that:  “many respondents concerned about 
women’s advancement in the profession recommended continuing to promote women to 
leadership roles, place them in increasingly important judicial posts, elevate them to 
Supreme Court, and find more women to teach at law school and assume deanships.”233
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All of these solutions will aid in improving the experiences of women in the court 
system at all levels.  Some are easier than others, but all, particularly the courtroom 
practices solutions, are important.  These are the recommendations that will truly impact 
the outcomes for women in the courtroom. 
Truth Commission Findings and Solutions 
 Before I conclude, I will briefly discuss Truth Commission’s findings from the 
Fourth Battered Mothers Custody Conference in Albany, New York in January 2007 in 
order to share women’s experiences as they told them to the Commission.  The Truth 
Commission is a panel of eight members, some lawyers and others advocates.  Sixteen 
women from eleven states testified about their experience with family law cases.  I will 
discuss this document first since it covers a broader geographic area and illustrates 
general themes across state lines of gender bias.  The most common theme from the 
women was that “there is a widespread problem of abusive parents being granted custody 
of children and protective parents having their custody limited or denied, and/or being 
otherwise punished.”234  While I am highlighting only select findings and proposed 
solutions, the Commission found several problems in the family court system.   
According to the Commission’s findings, “[c]ourt appointees, state actors and 
other professionals are frequently biased, particularly gender-biased, misogynistic, 
incompetent, and inadequately trained in domestic violence and child abuse.”235  They 
propose that additional and more comprehensive research needs to be conducted in order 
to determine “how many children are sent to live with abusers and how often custody 
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scandal cases occur.”236  They also advocate for “effective, quality, in depth training on 
domestic violence, child sexual abuse, child physical abuse…for all court 
professionals.”237  They would also like to see a national training curriculum on domestic 
violence for all court personnel, legal professionals, and judges. 
The Commission found that “[j]udges who preside over custody cases exhibit 
clear bias against women”238 and the Commission calls for their identification and 
training to educate them on proper conduct.  In addition, evaluators often performed 
biased assessments and they are not always selected based on “competency in evaluated 
domestic violence, child sexual abuse or child physical abuse.”239  Because of this lack of 
competency and bias, they sometimes rely on questionable science, such as parental 
alienation syndrome.  The Commission recommends that evaluators not be allowed to 
override judicial authority in custody disputes and that they should be required to have 
expertise in the area upon which they are called.  Mediators also are used when they 
should not be, such as in cases with domestic violence or child abuse, and like evaluators, 
they often employ parental alienation syndrome.  The Commission opposes mediators’ 
involvement in cases of domestic violence.  Furthermore, the Commission found that 
“[a]ttorneys are sometimes biased against women….Abusers attorneys are often 
overaggressive and may suborn or encourage perjury.”240  This has obvious negative 
implications on women, such there is often already a power imbalance in domestic 
violence cases, and if an abusive husband’s attorney is encouraging detrimental behavior, 
her chances of gaining custody and adequate maintenance are in serious jeopardy.  In 
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addition, some poor litigants, often mothers, lack an attorney, while the moneyed spouse 
has competent counsel.  The Commission calls for close regulation of attorneys “by an 
independent citizen oversight committee to ensure that child and victim protection is their 
primary concern and to prevent abuse of power”241 and that counsel fees must be 
awarded to level the playing field. 
The Commission found that overall, “[p]rofessionals fail to give credence to 
abuse and disregard the safety of the children and their mothers”242 and that “[t]here is a 
reliance on myths, not research.”243  The Commission would like to see courts err on the 
side of safety for women and children in cases of abuse and they urge the establishment 
of clear guidelines and protocols to identify domestic violence.  They also want to see all 
family court cases screened for domestic violence, child physical or sexual abuse and 
substance abuse through a nationally recognized valid domestic violence screening 
instrument.  While the screening is taking place, the child should stay with the safe, 
protective parent.  The Commission also recommends that if the primary aggressor does 
not complete an ordered program, such as anger management, supervised visitation 
should continue.   
Another solution proposed by the Commission is the passage of a Protective 
Parent Reform Act.  These acts prevent protective parents from being punished for trying 
to protect their children.  One such act is currently in front of the New York State 
Assembly and Senate now.  Bill number A07089 (and S6201) “[p]rovides that a person 
shall not be penalized in child custody hearings for making good faith efforts to protect a 
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child against abuse.”244  There has been intermittent action on the bill since it was 
introduced early last year.  Most recently, on March 26, 2008, it passed in the Assembly, 
was delivered to the Senate, and was referred to Social Services, Children and Families.  
All 141 present members of the Assembly voted in favor of the act.  Essentially, the act 
provides that “a good faith allegation of abuse cannot be held against the accuser in child 
custody proceedings.”245  It also “required the court to consider the evidence of abuse in 
determining the visitation arrangement that is in the best interest of the child.”246  This 
act helps to prevent gender bias in the court by protecting women against the tendency of 
judges to doubt the validity of abused women’s allegations and to trivialize their concerns 
of protecting their children.  This act also addresses the danger that children end up in the 
hands of their abusers since it requires the court to consider abuse in visitation.  This is a 
strong act that will hopefully become law in the near future. 
The Truth Commission’s findings reflect an overall environment in which 
“[g]ender bias is blatant and epidemic by almost all the players in the court system.”247  
The lack of training of judges and court personnel in domestic violence, the lack of 
expertise of evaluators, and the failure to provide both litigants with adequate 
representation all make women’s court experiences more traumatic and difficult.  The 
reforms the Commission proposes, including Protective Parent Reform Acts, are 
important steps to curbing the current bias.  Much of their findings and solutions coincide 
with task forces’ work throughout the country, including New York, demonstrating the 
pervasiveness of the disorder in the courts. 
                                                 
244 Text of bill may be accessed at <http://assembly.state.ny.us/leg/?bn=A07089>. 
245 Ibid. 
246 Ibid. 
247 Battered Mothers Custody Conference, p. 8. 
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The National Organization for Women 
 The New York State chapter of the National Organization for Women knows that 
gender bias exists for women in the New York court system.  Marcia Pappas, president of 
NOW New York State, asserts that “[m]any women choose to maintain their 
confidentiality for fear of retaliation from…officers of the courts….Any woman who 
feels that she has been a victim of bias in the courts, should send their complaints to 
NewYorkStateNOW@aol.com.”248  NOW stresses that “[w]omen must be able to report 
biased judges without fear of being retaliated against by the court”249 and since the court-
appointed Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts finds that gender bias still exists, 
it must be addressed more aggressively. 
 Because of this fear of retaliation, many women do not come forward with gender 
bias complaints.  One woman, however, made her case public and submitted a statement 
to NOW-NYS to let women know that they are not alone.  Esther Yang, a survivor of 
domestic violence – verbally, psychologically, and financially abused – experienced 
threats from her husband (Mr. Carter) during their divorce as well and even obtained a 
temporary order of protection.  She claims that he attempted to conceal his current and 
future disability benefits from her and the court while simultaneously trying to obtain 
custody of their daughter.  Her husband did not readily supply his medical records nor 
fully disclose marital assets and income.  However, the court issued a decision, awarding 
only $5,000 in counsel fees and a temporary monthly maintenance of $1,667.00 based on 
the incomplete and inaccurate information he provided.  Esther Yang states that due to 
                                                 
248 National Organization for Women-New York State. December 2006. “National Organization for 
Women – New York State Questions the Alleged Bias and Punitive Decisions Made by NYS Supreme 
Court Judge Joan Lobis.” Retrieved 12 April 2008 <http://www.nownys.org/pr_2006/pr_121806.html>. 
249 Ibid. 
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her husband’s lies and Justice Joan Lobis’s (the judge in the case) allowances of her 
husband’s tactics, she experienced gender bias within the court system.  Yang claims that 
Lobis’s law secretary, Ms. Sugarman “changed custody to my ex-husband without a 
custody hearing and denied us to be in front of a judge after my ex-husband retained a 
political patron.”250 (Please see Appendix C for her complete statement.) 
 NOW-NYS emphasizes that since we know that gender bias in the courts exists, 
we must be more cautious of policy initiatives that may cause additional harm to women.  
For example, NOW-NYS would like to see divorces settled outside of court by the parties 
involved rather than by a no-fault divorce arrangement.  NOW-NYS reasons that if there 
is gender bias in the courts, it is likely that women will experience discrimination in 
court-ordered settlements, as the Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts found.  It is 
imperative that the courts recognize that gender bias is a pervasive problem and it must 
be continually addressed, starting with the recommendations that the NYS Office of 
Court Administration has issued. 
There have been three issue areas of gender bias that this chapter has explored:  
language, court practices, and women in the legal profession.  The findings and solutions 
are all extremely relevant to the disadvantages that women face in the courts.  I would 
like to highlight several reforms that appear most important to implement in order to 
work to eliminate the gender bias uncovered in the courts.   
Structurally, a solution that stands out the most is to educate judges.  Consistently, 
the Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts found that judges are not aware of the 
gender dynamics of family law cases and do not always look for all the issues that a 
woman may be experiencing in divorce, custody, and domestic violence cases.  For 
                                                 
250 Ibid. 
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instance, judges do not always think to evaluate pre-divorce standards of living in 
maintenance awards, and thus their awards are often unrealistic.  They also fail to 
regularly provide counsel fees, ignoring the often financially disadvantaged wife, and 
judges do not consider the double burden that many women experience in caring for the 
home and holding a job.  Most troubling is judges’ failure to recognize domestic violence 
and to address the issues associated with abuse.  The lack of counsel fees awarded in 
these circumstances and the failure to comprehend the power and control that abuse 
victims experience jeopardizes the safety of the most vulnerable women.  In addition, 
judges need to immediately dismiss any verbal comment of gender bias and encourage 
gender neutral language by using it themselves.  They should serve as mentors to women 
lawyers and less senior women judges.  Setting a positive example is crucial to 
establishing a court free of gender bias.  
Furthermore, court administrators and the legislature play a role in eliminating 
gender bias as well.   Court administrators need to ensure that judges, law guardians, 
forensic experts, and court personnel are educated on matrimonial and domestic violence 
issues and realize the importance of this education in family law cases.  In addition, the 
legislature needs to make counsel fees mandatory in matrimonial cases, provide 
appropriate funding for programs to educate judges, and should increase pay to attorneys 
who are assigned to family law cases. 
The National Organization for Women will remain available for women who 
experience gender bias.  In order to prevent further gender bias, NOW advocates for 
mandatory counsel fees in matrimonial cases and opposes mandatory joint custody and 
mandatory mediation.  As I stated previously, gender bias in the courtroom does not 
     85
occur in a vacuum.  The court is directly impacted by societal norms and our society 
consistently discriminates against women in pay, taking their claims seriously, and in 
providing constitutional equality.  Courtroom officials live in this society everyday and 
are bound to transfer biases they hold and observe to the courtroom.  Though there are 
many solutions proposed here, none is a quick fix for gender bias.  It is my and NOW’s 
hope that continuously drawing attention to the matter will keep it as a salient issue that 
will demonstrate steady improvement.  By enhancing NOW’s partnerships with legal 
professionals and bar associations, NOW can continue to remain vigilant of women’s 
experiences in the courtroom and attempt to encourage pro bono assistance in family 
court cases while ensuring that eliminating gender bias remains an important goal for 
both their organization and the legal community. 
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Disorder in the Courts 
 This thesis examined three areas of importance to domestic relations law:  
unilateral no-fault divorce, mandatory joint custody and mandatory mediation, and 
gender bias in the court system.  Unilateral no-fault divorce should not be enacted in New 
York at this time.  Other divorce reforms, such as a counsel fee bill, improvements in 
maintenance laws, and the extension of the statute of limitations on domestic violence, 
should be implemented prior to examining any proposal for unilateral no-fault divorce.  
In addition, by making joint custody or mediation mandatory in all custody disputes, the 
court would be instituting dangerous one-size-fits-all policies.  Currently, the 
overwhelming majority of separating couples reach a custody agreement on their own 
and this process should not be overridden by mandatory initiatives.  Judges and mediators 
also are not thoroughly trained in detecting domestic violence and thus to mandate joint 
custody and mediation is dangerous for battered women.  Furthermore, gender bias is a 
significant problem in the state court system and judges and court personnel must be 
educated in bias-free behavior, particularly in the dynamics of matrimonial cases and 
domestic violence. 
 All of these issue areas are compounded by one another.  The gender bias in the 
courtroom reveals that judges and legal professionals are less versed in issues that come 
up in domestic relations law than they should be.  They do not realize that maintenance 
awards should be higher and that the cost of divorce is a major obstacle for many women.  
If judges and other trained court officials do not take these issues into consideration, it is 
unlikely that mediators without strict credential standards will adequately address these 
concerns.  Furthermore, the majority of the outcomes in mediation are joint custody with 
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many mediators even readily admitting that joint custody is the goal of the mediation.  
Girdner reports that “[a]ccording to one such mediator:  ‘Mediation may thus be seen as a 
procedural handmaiden to joint custody and a device for implementing its values.’  When 
mediation is mandatory, this raises the question of the role of the state and mediation in 
the implementation of a new ideology.”251  In the same chapter, I addressed how joint 
custody is problematic in some instances.  In already embattled custody disputes, 
continued association between the parents can often exacerbate familial chaos, taking a 
direct toll on children.  In addition, domestic violence victims are often left at the 
wayside since courts do not always recognize domestic abuse and abusive husbands may 
use custody as a tactic to punish their wives.  Finally, divorce reforms must be enacted, 
but it is important to pass bills that will help women in a court with gender bias, rather 
than pass reforms, such as no-fault divorce, that will hinder women.  Without a counsel 
fee bill and without the recognition of domestic violence, those who are most vulnerable 
(poor, abused women) are not helped by the court system. 
 NOW-NYS’s goal has always been to affect change for the thousands of women 
and children in the state.  At this time and with these bills, unilateral no-fault divorce, 
mandatory joint custody, and mandatory mediation should not be enacted and gender bias 
in the court system must be addressed.  NOW-NYS will continue to work for women and 
children and the organization makes domestic relations a priority issue because when 
marriages dissolve, women are often most vulnerable.  NOW-NYS is proud to lobby on 
behalf of women and children and will persist in fighting disorder in the courts.  
                                                 
251 Girdner, Linda K. 1989. “Custody Mediation in the United States:  Empowerment of Social Control?” 
Canadian Journal of Women & the Law 3(1): 134-154, p. 142. 
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Appendix A:  Survey Questionnaire 
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 Source: New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts.  June 2002. “Women in the Courts: 
A Work in Progress 15 Years After the Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts.” 
Retrieved 12 April 2008 <http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/ 
womeninthecourts_report.pdf>, p. 74-75. 
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Appendix B:  Women in the Justice System 
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Source:  New York State Judicial Committee on Women in the Courts.  June 2002. “Women in the Courts: 
A Work in Progress 15 Years After the Report of the New York Task Force on Women in the Courts.” 
Retrieved 12 April 2008 <http://www.courts.state.ny.us/ip/womeninthecourts/ 
womeninthecourts_report.pdf>, p. 69-72 
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Appendix C:  Statement by Esther Yang 
"I have always believed in the integrity of a judicial system that NEVER FAILS. My 
family raised me to believe that the truth always rises to the TOP. 
 
I was dragged to the courtroom by my ex-husband who uses it as his scorched litigation 
bully playpen. I feel I have been victimized twice when Justice Lobis refused to 
acknowledge my ex-husband's fraudulent, pendent-lite (asking spousal support and child 
support). My ex-husband has admitted on the stand, that he claimed our daughter and me 
as dependents in VA disability then sued me for child support to double-dip, not to 
mention he has forged my signature to get money, submitted false documents, relocated 3 
hours away, enrolled our minor daughter in a new school, shockingly was forced to 
relocate back, because Justice Lobis gave him the final decision on education, he then put 
our daughter in a failing school and in a failing district, got me arrested via a false police 
report and bogus charges. And, in Justice Lobis's recent ruling, unless I came up with $3, 
000 by December 5, 2006, I would be jailed for 30 days with a civil and criminal record. 
My ex-husband has dragged me, as a defendant, to more than 6 different courts in 
different counties. What a waste of taxpayers' money! My ex-husband and his attorneys 
walk on water and are allowed to continuously lie in Justice Lobis's courtroom. My 
parents raised me to believe that in this great country of ours, the best liars don't win. 
Clearly that was not so in my case. 
 
I am confused to why Justice Lobis chose to allow both forensic experts to NOT review 
my ex-husband's fraudulent VA disability nor read his medical records. If Justice Lobis is 
not looking out for our daughter's best interest, then who is??? Our daughter scored in the 
top 8 percentile from a testing bureau many top schools in Manhattan use, who can offer 
her scholarship. 
Justice Lobis feels that it is okay to put our daughter in a failing State school and in a 
Title I Federal failing school. Clearly my ex-husband chooses to attack my Chinese 
culture where we believe education is important. My ex and his attorneys faxed a letter to 
her chambers that our daughter, who is half Chinese, cannot spend the Chinese New Year 
with me because "... The MOTHER IS NOT CHINESE.... " I cannot imagine our 
daughter not having a law guardian to protect her interests. 
 
Since our daughter's abrupt relocation, Justice Lobis has changed our daughter's time 
with me 5 times in less than a year. Her law secretary, Ms. Sugarman, changed custody to 
my ex-husband without a custody hearing and denied us to be in front of a judge after my 
ex-husband retained a political patron, Saul and Adam Edelstein, to live in a home that 
has no certificate of occupancy from the Department of Buildings. I am confused as to 
how all of the above is in the best interest of our daughter."  
 
Anonymous victim statement: "Justice Lobis and her law clerk, Ms. Marilyn Sugarman, 
are punitive to women and mothers. They neglect the innocent children they are entrusted 
to protect." 
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Statement by Mo Therese Hannah: "Throughout New York State, mothers who seek legal 
protections from abusive partners are, instead, being subjected to further abuse within the 
divorce/child custody court system. "Scorched-earth" litigation processes that culminate 
in gender-biased, unjust rulings become the primary vehicle by which abusive men re-
abuse their partners. Women's groups throughout New York State are organizing to 
demand court reform and to express their outrage against these kinds of practices, which 
are harming so many women like Esther Yang." Mo Therese Hannah, Ph.D.Chair, 
Battered Mothers Custody Conference IV www.batteredmotherscustodyconference.org. 
Source:  National Organization for Women.  Retrieved 12 April 2008 
<http://www.nownys.org/pr_2006/pr_121806.html>. 
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